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I. INTRODUCTION
This interdisciplinary Article employs a scientific approach to
euthanize any suggestion that plausibility pleading is empirically sup-
portable.  In the Twombly1 and Iqbal2 decisions in 2007 and 2009, the
Supreme Court replaced the liberal notice pleading standard of Conley
v. Gibson3 with a heightened requirement4 that pleadings must be
plausible to survive a motion to dismiss.5
Unlike previous scholarship, I address plausibility in light of a
broader defect plaguing all legal theory; courts are not required to de-
fend their hypotheses or legal theories in the same empirical manner
as scientists.6  For example, lower courts and practitioners alike are
forced to assume and accept the existence of the plausibility standard
simply because it was conjured by the Supreme Court.  Admittedly, a
scientific perspective may limit development of the law, but it ensures
that judges, scholars, and legal practitioners are practicing a body of
law which at least partly reflects the reality and limitations of our
physical universe.  This Article demonstrates plausibility pleading is
devoid of any connection to that reality.
The Article begins with a brief analysis of what the language of
Iqbal and Twombly claims plausibility pleading is, followed by a care-
ful examination of the additional subtext in the decisions which ex-
plains what plausibility is not.7  I demonstrate that the most
conspicuous and important aspect of this subtext is the significant ju-
dicial effort the Twombly Court expended to emphasize the consis-
1. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
4. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
6. THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2717 (Lesley Brown ed., 4th ed.,
1993) (defining scientific method “as [a] method of procedure that has character-
ized natural science since the [17th century], consisting in systematic observa-
tion, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and
modification of hypothesis”).
7. See infra Part II.
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tency of its decision with the 2002 Swierkiewicz8 decision, in which a
unanimous Supreme Court reaffirmed the previously existing motion
to dismiss standard.9
Next, in accord with the Article’s unique approach, I examine the
actual pleadings in the Swierkiewicz case.10  Therein, the analysis of
the pleadings reveals the absolute falsity of the Supreme Court’s claim
that Twombly is consistent with Swierkiewicz.11  I explain how the
motion to dismiss in Swierkiewicz expressly argued for the application
of the identical plausibility standard adopted in Twombly and Iqbal,12
and I further explain how this is the same standard the Court unani-
mously rejected seven years prior in Swierkiewicz as being beyond its
power to implement.13
Using an analogy to Bayesian mathematical theory, the Article
demonstrates, despite the Supreme Court’s claim to the contrary, that
the plausibility analysis is a probability analysis.14  I argue this
probability analysis is abhorrent to the constitutionally mandated di-
vision of labor between judge and jury in the civil system,15 and it
represents a radical, normative shift in established pleading
standards.16
The Article next applies modern neuroscientific research discuss-
ing limits on human beings’ ability to empathize, and it specifically
discusses the existence of a genetic predisposition to bias against phe-
notypically distinct individuals.17  I explain how this research dispels
the scholarly suggestion that plausibility and its encouragement of
“judicial experience and common sense”18 is a waypoint to a laudable,
empathy based, utopian judicial state.19
Additionally, the Article demonstrates the first step in determining
plausibility—the separation of law from fact is widely acknowledged,
including by the Supreme Court itself—is as an impossible feat.20
Further, the Article reveals how markedly similar plausibility is to a
constitutionally prohibited credibility analysis.21
8. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
9. See id. at 514–15.
10. See infra subsection III.A.2.
11. See infra subsection III.A.2.
12. See infra notes 111–116 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 117–122 and accompanying text.
14. See infra subsection III.B.1.
15. See infra section III.B.
16. See infra section III.B.
17. See infra subsection III.C.1.
18. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
19. See infra subsections III.C.1–2.
20. See infra subsections III.D.1–2.
21. See infra section III.E.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB201.txt unknown Seq: 4 30-NOV-11 7:07
438 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:435
Finally, the Article suggests plausibility analysis is a nonsensical
amalgam of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9(b), 11 and 12.22  I
demonstrate any pleading deemed not plausible pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) also violates Rule 11.23  Further, I show that the pleading
standard of Rule 8 is now indistinguishable from and possibly higher
than Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.24
II. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT CLAIMS PLAUSIBILITY
IS AND IS NOT
As a pleading standard, plausibility was birthed in Twombly and
developed in Iqbal.25 Twombly involved a suit against a number of
telecommunication companies alleging an illegal agreement or con-
spiracy of noncompetitive behavior, violative of antitrust law, had
harmed consumers.26 Twombly overruled the language of Conley,
which for years had been the mantra by which federal courts deter-
mined whether to dismiss a complaint.27  The Conley standard, how-
ever, was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz in 2002.28
The Swierkiewicz decision is remarkable because a unanimous Su-
preme Court reaffirmed that it was without constitutional power to
change the pleading standard announced in Conley.29  Under Conley,
a complaint would not be dismissed unless it appeared beyond doubt
that a plaintiff could develop no set of facts in support of the com-
22. See infra section III.F.
23. See infra subsection III.F.1.
24. See infra subsection III.F.2.
25. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (referring to the Twombly deci-
sion as a starting point for plausibility analysis and elaborating on the require-
ments of the plausibility analysis as laid down in Twombly).
26. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007) (“[T]his action against peti-
tioners, a group of ILECs, plaintiffs seek treble damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief for claimed violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
‘[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions.’” (citation omitted)).
27. Id. at 562–63.  In overruling Conley, the court noted:
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further citations to show
that Conley’s “no set of facts” language has been questioned, criticized,
and explained away long enough.  To be fair to the Conley Court, the
passage should be understood in light of the opinion’s preceding sum-
mary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court quite rea-
sonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief.  But the passage
so often quoted fails to mention this understanding on the part of the
Court, and after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous obser-
vation has earned its retirement.  The phrase is best forgotten as an in-
complete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.
Id.
28. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
29. Id. at 514–15.
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plaint.30 Twombly altered this liberal test for determining the legal
sufficiency of a complaint.31
Iqbal followed Twombly and was more politically charged.  It in-
volved a post-September 11th lawsuit brought by Arab-Muslim de-
tainees against the federal attorney general and the head of the FBI.32
It alleged executive-level, illegal, race-based, and discriminatory poli-
cies—developed and enforced by the two named defendants—resulted
in their detention.33  Now, post-Iqbal, in determining the legal suffi-
ciency of a complaint under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a federal district
court judge must determine whether a complaint is plausible.34  If not,
a complaint is dismissed as failing to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.35
Determining the plausibility of a complaint is a two-step process.36
First, a court must separate factual content from nonfactual content
(legal conclusions, etc.).37  The non-factual allegations are ignored as
if they do not exist for the purposes of determining the sufficiency of
the complaint.38  The justification for ignoring non-factual allegations
30. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“In appraising the sufficiency of the
complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.”).
31. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63.
32. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).  The relevant and succinct facts of
Iqbal include the following:
Respondent Javaid Iqbal is a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim.  In
the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks he was arrested in
the United States on criminal charges and detained by federal officials.
Respondent claims he was deprived of various constitutional protections
while in federal custody.  To redress the alleged deprivations, respon-
dent filed a complaint against numerous federal officials, including John
Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert
Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  Ash-
croft and Mueller are the petitioners in the case now before us.  As to
these two petitioners, the complaint alleges that they adopted an uncon-
stitutional policy that subjected respondent to harsh conditions of con-
finement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.
Id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 1949 (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1950 (“Our decision in Twombly illustrates the two-pronged approach.”).
37. Id. at 1951 (“In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. . . . When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”).
38. Id. at 1951 (“We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in the com-
plaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”).
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is that only well-pleaded facts, as opposed to well-pleaded allegations
of the non-factual variety, are entitled to the presumption of truth at
the motion to dismiss stage.39  Second, the process involves a determi-
nation of whether the factual content of the complaint—taken as true,
examined in isolation, and afforded the favorable presumption men-
tioned above—demonstrates a plausible entitlement to relief.40
Under this two-step process, the Supreme Court expanded on the
definition of plausibility described above.41  According to the Court, a
complaint which contains factual allegations consistent with the the-
ory of alleged recovery establishes sheer possibility of entitlement to
relief, but falls short of the line between possibility and plausibility.42
Only a complaint establishing plausible entitlement to relief will sur-
vive a motion to dismiss, but one which merely establishes possibility
of relief is dismissed without discovery.43
The Court further explained that a complaint is plausible only
when the factual allegations permit, not merely an inference, but a
reasonable inference the plaintiff was harmed as a result of the al-
leged cause of action.44  Despite these references to possibility and
plausibility, the Court explains it is not engaging in probability
analysis.45
Finally, and most remarkably in my opinion, is the great judicial
effort the Supreme Court expended in the Twombly opinion to reas-
sure that plausibility is no different than the pleading standard reaf-
39. Id. (distinguishing the presumptions afforded legal conclusions and facts in a
complaint, and stating “[a]lthough for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we
must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we ‘are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’”).
40. Id. (describing the second step of the plausibility analysis as “consider[ing] the
factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they plausibly sug-
gest an entitlement to relief”).
41. See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 1949 (explaining the difference between possibility and plausibility, stating
“[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitle-
ment to relief”’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007))).
43. See id.  Some scholars analogize the hasty, plausibility-based, pre-discovery, and
judicial dismissal of the discrimination claims in Iqbal to the infamous Kore-
matsu case, which upheld the constitutionality of the internment of Japanese
Americans, and find the result just as offensive. See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu,
First Korematsu and now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime
Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 419,
426–27 (2010).
44. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (describing “facial plausibility” as “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).
45. See id. (stating, unambiguously, that “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a de-
fendant has acted unlawfully”).
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firmed in Swierkiewicz.46  As a result of this consistency, the Twombly
Court explains plausibility is not a heightened pleading standard.47
Consistency with Swierkiewicz was critical to the validity of Twombly
because Swierkiewicz emphasized that heightened pleading standards
can only be achieved via the procedure established in the Rules Ena-
bling Act and not by judicial interpretation.48
III. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PLAUSIBILITY
A. Ignored Pleadings
1. The Pre-Iqbal Possibility of Consistency between Twombly
and Swierkiewicz
In order to appreciate the importance of the Court’s 2002
Swierkiewicz decision, it is necessary to put that case in the context of
reaffirming the pleading standard Conley announced.  Much has been
written on the difference in the old Conley standard and the famous
language now retired by the Twombly decision.  In my conversations
with professor Glashausser, he beleived it was unnecessary for the
Twombly Court to retire the “no set of facts”49 language from Conley
in order to conclude the Twombly complaint was legally insufficient.50
I agree.  The Conley complaint was plausible under the Twombly plau-
sibility standard and the Twombly complaint did not provide enough
notice to satisfy the Conley standard.51  If Twombly truly was consis-
tent with Swierkiewicz, plausibility in Twombly would then merely be
alternative phraseology for the requirement that a pleading provide
adequate notice.52  Before Iqbal, but not after, this was a plausible53
interpretation of Twombly.
The oft-quoted language from Conley is that a “complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”54  According to the Twombly opin-
46. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007) (explaining at length the
consistency between Swierkiewicz and plausibility).
47. See id. at 569 n.14 (“In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any ‘heightened’
pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished ‘by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’” (citing Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002))).
48. Id. at 569–70 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)).
49. Id. at 562–63 (criticizing and overruling Conley’s language).
50. Thanks to my colleague Alex Glashausser for indulging me in many debates over
the impact of Twombly.
51. See infra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
53. Pun intended.
54. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
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ion, this was an appropriate standard in the context of the Conley
complaint.55
Examining that context, Conley involved Black railway workers
suing under the Railway Labor Act.56  They alleged their union repre-
sentative discriminated against them on the basis of race and did not
represent them fairly.57  They further alleged this discrimination was
a direct violation of the Railway Labor Act, which mandated equal
representation of all workers fairly and without discrimination based
on race.58
According to the Supreme Court, the concrete allegations of the
Conley complaint can be summed up as follows:
[1] Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad at its
Houston Freight House.  [2] Local 28 of the Brotherhood was the designated
bargaining agents under the Railway Labor Act for the bargaining unit to
which petitioners belonged.  [3] A contract existed between the Union and the
Railroad which gave the employees in the bargaining unit certain protection
from discharge and loss of seniority.  [4] In May 1954, the Railroad purported
to abolish 45 jobs held by petitioners or other Negroes all of whom were either
discharged or demoted.  [5] In truth the 45 jobs were not abolished at all but
instead filled by whites as the Negroes were ousted, except for a few instances
where Negroes were rehired to fill their old jobs but with loss of seniority.  [6]
Despite repeated pleas by petitioners, the Union, acting according to plan, did
nothing to protect them against these discriminatory discharges and refused
to give them protection comparable to that given white employees.  [7] The
complaint then went on to allege that the Union had failed in general to re-
present Negro employees equally and in good faith.  [8] And it concluded by
asking for relief in the nature of declaratory judgment, injunction and
damages.59
In support of dismissal for failure to state a claim, the union in
Conley argued “that the complaint failed to set forth specific facts to
support its general allegations of discrimination and that its dismissal
is therefore proper.”60  In rejecting this assertion, the Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.  To the contrary, all the Rules
require is a “short and plain statement of the claim” that will give the defen-
dant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.61
55. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (“To be fair to the Conley
Court, the passage should be understood in light of the opinion’s preceding sum-
mary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably
understood as amply stating a claim for relief.”).
56. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 43.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 47.
61. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
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The Court reiterated the “purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits.”62  In 2002, Swierkiewicz also reaffirmed that a
complaint will survive a motion to dismiss “because it gives . . . fair
notice of the basis for petitioner’s claims.”63
The Conley pleadings would have survived the Twombly plausibil-
ity analysis.  In fact, Twombly noted that the language quoted above
may have been suitable for Conley, in light “of the complaint’s concrete
allegations.”64  For this same reason, the Swierkiewicz pleadings
would have survived the Twombly plausibility analysis.  That com-
plaint—like the Conley complaint—also contained concrete allega-
tions which would give notice:
Applying the relevant standard, petitioner’s complaint easily satisfies the re-
quirements of Rule 8(a) because it gives respondent fair notice of the basis for
petitioner’s claims.  Petitioner alleged that he had been terminated on account
of his national origin in violation of Title VII and on account of his age in
violation of the ADEA.  His complaint detailed the events leading to his termi-
nation, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at
least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination.  These allega-
tions give respondent fair notice of what petitioner’s claims are and the
grounds upon which they rest.  In addition, they state claims upon which re-
lief could be granted under Title VII and the ADEA.65
Central to the plausibility debate is the Twombly Court’s determi-
nation that the Twombly complaint’s allegation of parallel conduct
made conspiracy conceivable but not plausible.66  The Twombly Court
is clear, however, that even if there was no allegation of parallel con-
duct as the basis of an agreement, the complaint would still be dis-
missed because it failed to satisfy Conley’s standard, which was an
articulation of Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice requirement:
If the complaint had not explained that the claim of agreement rested on the
parallel conduct described, we doubt that the complaint’s references to an
agreement among the ILECs would have given the notice required by Rule 8.
Apart from identifying a seven-year span in which the [section] 1 violations
were supposed to have occurred . . . the pleadings mentioned no specific time,
place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies.  This lack of notice con-
trasts sharply with the model form for pleading negligence, Form [11], which
the dissent says exemplifies the kind of “bare allegation” that survives a mo-
tion to dismiss.  Whereas the model form alleges that the defendant struck the
plaintiff with his car while plaintiff was crossing a particular highway at a
specified date and time, the complaint here furnishes no clue as to which of the
four ILECs (much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when
and where the illicit agreement took place.  A defendant wishing to prepare an
answer in the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to
62. Id. at 48.
63. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
64. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007).
65. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
66. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–58 (explaining that parallel conduct does not plau-
sibly suggest conspiracy).
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answer; a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations in
the [section] 1 context would have little idea where to begin.67
In Twombly, the Supreme Court “retired” the no set of facts lan-
guage from Conley, not because it thought it was wrong but because it
felt it was wrongly interpreted.68  As a result, the Court in Twombly is
careful to define any inconsistency between plausibility and the Con-
ley standard not as conflict, but only as “ostensible conflict,” or conflict
in the application.69
The Twombly Court interpreted the Conley language to mean “once
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”70
Conley therefore described the breadth of opportunity to prove what
an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate
pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”71
The Twombly Court is absolutely correct.  Interpreted literally, the
Conley language could be extrapolated to a ludicrous extent.  Consider
the following hypothetical pleading:
On date, in Topeka, Kansas, the Pope, after getting stoned while attending a
pro-choice rally, on a secret trip from the Vatican to attend a Kansas City
Royals game, negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff, Sarah
Palin, while the plaintiff was tooling around town with her best friends
Michelle Obama and Hillary Clinton.  As a result, the plaintiff was physically
injured, lost wages or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred
medical expenses.72
Under established jurisprudence regarding motions to dismiss, the al-
legations in this hypothetical pleading must be taken as true even if
the allegations seem improbable or unlikely to be proven true.73  Even
post-Iqbal, the factual allegations are purportedly still taken as true
at the motion to dismiss stage.74  Under Conley, as long as the claim
67. Id. at 565 n.10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 563 (describing the language of Conley as not incorrect per se, but as “an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard,” stating that the
“language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough by
courts and commentators, and is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss
on an accepted pleading standard”).
69. Id. at 560–61 (“Plaintiffs’ main argument against the plausibility standard at the
pleading stage is its ostensible conflict with a literal reading of Conley’s state-
ment construing Rule 8: ‘a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” (quoting Conley v. Gib-
son, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957))).
70. Id. at 563.
71. Id.
72. Thanks to Alex Glashausser for inspiring this illustrative complaint.  Of course
this assumes that Sarah Palin earns wages.
73. Hughes v. Roe, 449 U.S 5, 10 (1980).
74. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–52 (2009) (comparing the presumption of
truth afforded factual allegations with the lack of any such presumption for legal
conclusions); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[W]hen ruling
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was possible or conceivable, it survived the 12(b)(6) motion even if it
appeared, as above, “that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”75
The reason for this is that the merits of the claim should not be ad-
dressed at the pleading stage.76  True, the above pleading might vio-
late Rule 11(b)(3),77 but it would survive a motion to dismiss.  Despite
Conley’s liberal standard for surviving a motion to dismiss, not every
complaint survived.
For example, even under Conley, a complaint against Superman
for emerging from a comic book and battering the reader might not
survive.  A court could take judicial notice of the fact that Superman
does not exist and that he cannot come to life from a comic book.  In
fact, such allegations would probably not survive a Rule 12(f) motion
to strike.  Despite these limits, taken to the fullest extrapolation, the
language of Conley potentially allowed factually ludicrous complaints
to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as long as the underlying legal claim
was cognizable.
As a result, the Twombly Court may have concluded Conley’s no set
of facts language should be interpreted as presupposing that the alle-
gations of the complaint put the defendant on “fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”78  In other
words, according to Twombly, the Conley language should mean that
once a plaintiff has stated a claim, it should not be dismissed unless
no facts in support of the claim were alleged.79  Significantly,
Twombly did not dispel Conley’s notice requirement for stating a
claim, but added plausibility to notice as an additional requirement
for stating a claim.80
on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“[O]f course,
a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.’”).
75. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 326 (1974)).
76. See, e.g., Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; impor-
tantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses.”).
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring that the factual contentions appear to have
evidentiary support).
78. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
79. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 56 (“[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.”).
80. Id. at 558 (“Some threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before a
patent antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and pro-
tracted discovery phase.” (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003))).
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The complaint in Twombly failed to satisfy the Conley-based notice
requirement for stating a claim.  As a result, a plausible81 interpreta-
tion of plausibility after Twombly but before Iqbal—by those seeking
to marginalize Twombly’s impact on pleading—permits relegation of
the plausibility test to the stature of harmless error, dicta, superflu-
ous analysis, or of being applicable only to antitrust claims.82  The
complaint would not have stated a claim even if plausibility was never
applied.83
The specificity of the Conley and Swierkiewicz complaints, on the
one hand, are distinguishable from the Twombly complaint, on the
other.  The italicized language in the block quotes84 from the
Swierkiwicz and Conley cases reveals the similarity of the specificity.
In Conley, the complaint specified the month the alleged discrimina-
tion took place, the number of Black workers fired, the fact that
Whites were hired largely to fill the positions, and the specific bar-
gaining agent who allegedly violated federal law.85  Likewise, the
Swierkiewicz complaint alleges the dates when the alleged discrimina-
tory acts took place and the national origins and ages of the persons
involved in the firing of the plaintiff.86  The contrasting absence of no-
tice in the Twombly complaint is conspicuous, as discussed in footnote
ten of the Twombly opinion.87
This interpretation of Twombly relegates the importance of plausi-
bility to the decision’s outcome and simultaneously emphasizes the de-
cision as a mere modification of the Conley notice-based standard,
which accounts for the fact-specific complaint in Conley.  The Erickson
v. Pardus88 opinion—which came down only two months after
Twombly—provides further support for this limiting interpretation of
Twombly.
In Erickson, a prisoner alleged a “constitutional violation under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”89  He further alleged: “(1) he had hepatitis C; (2) he
was receiving treatment in prison; (3) prison officials were withhold-
ing his hepatitis C medicine; and (4) his life was in danger as a re-
81. Again, pun intended.
82. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (demonstrating the plausibility standard was in-
troduced to balance the costs of discovery in an antitrust suit with what the
plaintiff must show to subject the defendant to the burdens of antitrust
discovery).
83. See id. at 565 n.10.
84. See supra notes 59, 61, and 65 and accompanying text.
85. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 43–44 (1957).
86. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
87. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 n.10.
88. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
89. Id. at 89; see also Michael C. Leitch & Ryan C. Hudson, The Twombly Trilogy:
Exploring the New “Plausibility” Standard for Motions to Dismiss in Kansas Fed-
eral Courts, 79 J. KAN. B. ASS’N, May 2010, at 20, 22 (analyzing Erickson’s signifi-
cance concerning Twombly).
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sult.”90  The Supreme Court presumably concluded the complaint was
plausible by citing to Twombly,91 which in turn was cited as reaffirm-
ing the notice requirements of Conley,92 the case Twombly expressly
overruled.
Even though it was analytically possible to marginalize the import
and changes wrought by the plausibility standard in Twombly,93 the
elaboration of the plausibility standard in Iqbal forecloses any such
attempt.
2. The Swierkiewicz Pleadings
The Iqbal complaint, similar to the Conley and Swierkiewicz com-
plaints, contained specific dates, described specific events, and made
specific allegations.94  As previously described, the current plausibil-
ity test, as refined by Iqbal, requires the Court to ignore non-factual
allegations in assessing the legal sufficiency of a complaint.95  Assess-
90. Leitch & Hudson, supra note 89, at 22 (citing the facts listed in Erickson).
91. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93.
92. Id.  The Erickson Court specifically attributed Twombly credit for a quoted pas-
sage from Conley, stating:
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Specific facts are not necessary, the statement need only “give the defen-
dant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rest.”
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))).
93. See supra notes 79–92 and accompanying text.
94. See Sidhu, supra note 43, at 428–433 (explaining the painstaking detail of the
allegations in the Iqbal complaint and clearly demonstrating the specificity of the
allegations in terms of dates, parties, and conduct that constituted constitutional
violations).
95. According to Iqbal, the first step in the plausibility analysis is to identify and
reject allegations that are legal conclusions or conclusory.  “We begin our analysis
by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the as-
sumption of truth.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).  Allegations
not entitled to the presumption of truth are legal conclusions. See id.  “[T]he
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a com-
plaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” even when such a conclusion is
couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at 1949.  The next step is to reject these legal
conclusions. See id.  The Iqbal court clarifies that rejection is the equivalent of
disentitling an allegation to the presumption of truth:
To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that
they are unrealistic or nonsensical.  We do not so characterize them any
more than the Court in Twombly rejected the plaintiffs’ express allega-
tion of a “contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive en-
try,” because it thought that claim too chimerical to be maintained.  It is
the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations, rather than their ex-
travagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of
truth.
Id. at 1951 (citation omitted).
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ing the sufficiency of the complaint is then based on the remaining
factual allegations.96
Iqbal treated all allegations in the complaint that contained a legal
theory of recovery as nonfactual, and not entitled to the presumption
of truth.97  For example, allegations of discrimination were treated as
legal conclusions.98  As a result, under the Iqbal version of plausibil-
ity, the allegation of discrimination in Conley would be ignored and
the allegation of discrimination in Swierkiewicz would be irrelevant if
the justices felt the treatment could be alternatively explained.99  In-
deed, there is nothing in the language of the Conley or Swierkiewicz
complaints foreclosing the existence of an alternative reason for those
defendants’ actions.100
A closer examination of the Swierkiewicz pleadings further demon-
strates the disingenuous analysis the Court employed in Iqbal, where
the Court accepted the identical pleading theory it emphatically and
gratuitously explained it was without power to adopt in
Swierkiewicz.101  In Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff, a Hungarian national,
had worked as a senior vice president and chief underwriting officer
for a French company since 1989.102  In 1995, when the plaintiff was
fifty-three years old, the French CEO demoted him and transferred
the bulk of his underwriting jobs to a thirty-two year old French na-
tional.103  A year later, the French national was promoted to chief un-
derwriting officer after only one year of underwriting experience,
because the French CEO said he wanted to energize the depart-
ment.104  After complaining, the Hungarian national was given a Hob-
son’s choice between resigning and being fired.  He was subsequently
fired.105
96. Id. (explaining the next step after rejection of legal conclusions is to “consider the
factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they plausibly sug-
gest an entitlement to relief”).
97. See, e.g., id. (“These bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in
Twombly amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of
a constitutional discrimination claim, namely, that petitioners adopted a policy
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
As such, the allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1951–52 (explaining that a pleading, which merely states that discrimina-
tion occurred, is insufficient to state a claim unless additional information ex-
plains why the alleged discrimination is more probable).  “As between that
‘obvious alternative explanation’ for the arrests, and the purposeful, invidious
discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible con-
clusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
100. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
101. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
102. Id. at 508.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 509.
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The plaintiff brought suit alleging his termination was discrimina-
tory on the basis of age, nationality, and the facts described above.106
The district court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff had
not “alleged circumstances [facts] that support an inference of discrim-
ination.”107  The appellate court affirmed the dismissal for the same
reasons.108  The Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate
court.109
Unrecognized in any scholarship is the fact that the Swierkiewicz
opinion is not merely an implied rejection but an unequivocal rejection
of plausibility.  The motion to dismiss in the Swierkiewicz case specifi-
cally asked that the complaint be dismissed because a plausible infer-
ence of discrimination did not exist.110  A tabular comparison of the
statements in the Swierkiewicz memorandum supporting the motion
to dismiss—located at Table 1–and a description of Iqbal’s plauability
standard reveals the identity of Iqbal’s plausibility standard with the
standard rejected in Swierkiewicz.
TABLE 1
A Comparison of the Pleading Standard Rejected in
Swierkiewicz with the Standard Accepted in Iqbal.
The Heightened Pleading Standard
proposed in the Memo supporting the Statements from Iqbal describing the
Motion to Dismiss in Swierkiewicz, but Plausibility Pleading Standard
rejected by the Court.
“In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a
plaintiff ‘must specifically allege the events “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
claimed to constitute intentional complaint must contain sufficient factual
discrimination as well as circumstances matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
giving rise to a plausible inference’ of to relief that is plausible on its face.’”112
discriminatory intent.”111
106. Complaint at 7, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (No. 99-cv-
3917).
107. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509.
108. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 5 Fed. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2001).  The appellate
court explained its reasons for affirming the dismissal as follows:
With respect to national origin, the only circumstances Swierkiewicz
pled are that he is Hungarian, others at Sorema are French, and the
conclusory allegation that his termination was motivated by national or-
igin discrimination.  We agree with the district court that these allega-
tions are insufficient as a matter of law to raise an inference of
discrimination.
Id. at 64.
109. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
110. Memo in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 8–13, Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter
Swierkiewicz Memo].
111. Id. at 8.
112. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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“Bare assertions of discrimination, without
more, are insufficient to state a claim of “Threadbare recitals of the elements of adiscrimination.”  “[C]onclusory allegation cause of action, supported by mere‘fails to satisfy the minimum pleading conclusory statements, do not suffice.”114requirements applicable to claims arising
under Title VII . . . .’ ”113
“First, the tenet that a court must accept a“Plaintiff alleging [national origin] complaint’s allegations as true isdiscrimination must do more than recite inapplicable to threadbare recitals of aconclusory assertions . . . . In this action, cause of action’s elements, supported by[plaintiff] does not allege any facts that mere conclusory statements.”  “[T]he Rulewould connect her national origin with her does call for sufficient factual matter,termination, such that the Court could accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to reliefplausibly infer discriminatory intent.”115 that is plausible on its face.’”116
After balancing the vital yet distinct roles of discovery and plead-
ing in the civil justice system, the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz re-
jected the very pleading standard it adopted in Iqbal:
Under the Second Circuit’s heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff without
direct evidence of discrimination at the time of his complaint must plead [facts
giving an inference] of discrimination even though discovery might uncover
such direct evidence.  It thus seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order
to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately
need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is
discovered.117
Noteworthy here is the Supreme Court’s description of the exact
standard it rejected in Swierkiewicz but adopted in Iqbal as a “height-
ened pleading standard.”118  This is problematic because in
Swierkiewicz the Supreme Court was asked only to decide whether
plaintiff’s complaint survived a motion to dismiss based on the Conley
standard.119
113. Swierkiewicz Memo, supra note 110, at 10 (quoting and citing Andrews v.
Citigroup Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3221(HB), 1999 WL 1277427, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30,
1999); Alie v. Nynex Corp., 158 F.R.D. 239, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)).
114. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
115. Swierkiewicz Memo, supra note 110, at 10 (alterations in original) (quoting and
citing Farrell v. Child Welfare Admin., 77 F. Supp. 2d 329, 332 (E.D.N.Y 1999)).
116. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (quoting and citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
117. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court values the dichotomy of discovery and pleading as a means to
weed out meritless lawsuits in Swierkiewicz. See id. at 512–13.  It also acknowl-
edges that dispositive facts are unavailable at the pleading stage but the purpose
of discovery is to allow for the unearthing of such facts. See id.  Discovery, in the
eyes of the Swierkiewicz Court, is essential and functioning machinery of the civil
justice system.  See id. Twombly and Iqbal, by contrast, require the presentation
of dispositive facts at the pleading stage and scoff at the notion that discovery is a
functioning apparatus of civil justice. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953–54.
118. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–12.
119. See id. at 512.
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Instead of simply reversing the lower courts, a unanimous Su-
preme Court went further than required in Swierkiewicz, gratuitously
and strongly reaffirming the general pleading standard.120  The Court
emphasized Rule 8(a)’s standard did not require pleading of specific
facts.121  As a result, courts were not permitted, in light of the Rules
Enabling Act, to interpret the Federal Rules as requiring heightened
pleading other than where it was expressly required by the Rules: “A
requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that
‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and
not by judicial interpretation.’”122
In Twombly, the Court expended significant effort to explain how
the plausibility standard is consistent with Swierkiewicz and not a
forbidden, heightened pleading standard:
Plaintiffs say that our analysis runs counter to Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., which held that “a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit
[need] not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.”
They argue that just as the prima facie case is a “flexible evidentiary stan-
dard” that “should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for dis-
crimination cases,” “transpos[ing] ‘plus factor’ summary judgment analysis
woodenly into a rigid Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard . . . would be unwise.”
As the District Court correctly understood, however, “Swierkiewicz did not
change the law of pleading, but simply re-emphasized . . . that the Second
Circuit’s use of a heightened pleading standard for Title VII cases was con-
trary to the Federal Rules’ structure of liberal pleading requirements.”  Even
though Swierkiewicz’s pleadings “detailed the events leading to his termina-
tion, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at
least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination,” the Court of
Appeals dismissed his complaint for failing to allege certain additional facts
that Swierkiewicz would need at the trial stage to support his claim in the
absence of direct evidence of discrimination.  We reversed on the ground that
the Court of Appeals had impermissibly applied what amounted to a height-
ened pleading requirement by insisting that Swierkiewicz allege “specific
120. See id. at 514–15.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 515 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotic Intelligence & Coordi-
nation Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).  Earlier in the opinion, the Court was even
more specific on the concept, stating:
Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions,
with limited exceptions.  Rule 9(b), for example, provides for greater par-
ticularity in all averments of fraud or mistake.  This Court, however, has
declined to extend such exceptions to other contexts.  In Leatherman we
stated: “[T]he Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the question of the
need for greater particularity in pleading certain actions, but do not in-
clude among the enumerated actions any reference to complaints alleg-
ing municipal liability under § 1983. . . . Just as Rule 9(b) makes no
mention of municipal liability under . . . § 1983, neither does it refer to
employment discrimination.  Thus, complaints in these cases, as in most
others, must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a).
Id. at 513 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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facts” beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing enti-
tlement to relief.
Here, in contrast, we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.123
This judicial effort misstates the essence of the alleged defect in
the Swierkiewicz complaint.  The Supreme Court is correct in that the
broadly stated issue in the Swierkiewicz motion to dismiss was
whether the complaint established a prima facie case.124  However,
that is not the whole truth.  There are four elements related to a
prima facie case: “(1) membership in a protected group; (2) qualifica-
tion for the job in question; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4)
circumstances that support and inference of discrimination.”125  But
the only element actually at issue in Swierkiewicz was number four.
Or, as stated in the motion to dismiss, whether the plaintiff “specifi-
cally allege[d] the events claimed to constitute intentional discrimina-
tion as well as circumstances giving rise to a plausible inference” of
discrimination.126  The motion to dismiss clearly indicates that
Swierkiewicz is not a prima facie case, but more precisely concerns
whether there is a lack of facts permitting a plausible inference of
discrimination.127
The relevance of the motion to dismiss to the Supreme Court’s ulti-
mate decision is unique in the Swierkiewicz case because the appellate
decision simply, in its amazingly brief entirety, mirrors the reasoning
of the motion to dismiss.128  The court of appeals’ opinion in
123. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007) (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz Memo, supra note 110, at 8 (arguing Swierkiewicz failed to
meet the requirements of a prima facie case).
125. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
126. Swierkiewicz Memo, supra note 110, at 8 (quoting Andrews v. Citigroup Inc., No.
99 Civ. 3221(HB), 1999 WL 1277427, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1999)).
127. See id. (showing an absolute void of any argument suggesting that the larger
issue was plaintiff’s failure to satisfy a prima facie standard because the only
time a prima facie case is mentioned is to illustrate that element four of the
prima facie case is not satisfied).
128. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 5 Fed. App’x 63, 64–65 (2001).  In its entirety, sans
the reiterated facts, the appellate court stated:
It is well settled in this Circuit that a complaint consisting of nothing
more than naked assertions, and setting forth no facts upon which a
court could find a violation of the Civil Rights Acts, fails to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6).
To plead discrimination based on national origin, a plaintiff must al-
lege (1) membership, (2) qualification for the job in question, (3) an ad-
verse employment action and (4) circumstances that give support to an
inference of discrimination.  With respect to national origin, the only cir-
cumstances Swierkiewicz pled are that he is Hungarian, others at
Sorema are French, and the conclusory allegation that his termination
was motivated by national origin discrimination.  We agree with the dis-
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Swierkiewicz is completely devoid of the term “prima facie.”129
Rather, the decision emphasizes that the sole issue in Swierkiewicz is
the lack of facts permitting an inference of discrimination.130  As the
appellate court opined regarding Swierkiewicz’s national origin dis-
crimination claim:
With respect to national origin, the only circumstances Swierkiewicz pled are
that he is Hungarian, others at Sorema are French, and the conclusory allega-
tion that his termination was motivated by national origin discrimination.
We agree with the district court that these allegations are insufficient as a
matter of law to raise an inference of discrimination.131
Similarly, with respect to the age discrimination claim, the appel-
late court stated “[t]he only circumstance that Swierkiewicz alleges
gives rise to an inference of age discrimination is Chavel’s comment in
1995 that Chavel wanted to ‘energize’ the underwriting department.
We agree with the district court that this allegation is insufficient as a
matter of law to raise an inference of discrimination.”132
In rejecting these appellate conclusions concerning the necessity of
inferences or plausible inferences, the Supreme Court unambiguously
stated that the only thing a complaint must do in order to satisfy Rule
8(a)(2) is include  “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”133  The simple purpose of such a
statement, according to the Court, is to “give the defendant fair notice
of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”134
Therefore, contrary to the deceptive and broad-brush analysis the
Supreme Court employed in Twombly, the plausibility pleading stan-
dard is not the same pleading standard reaffirmed in Swierkiewicz.
Rather, it is clearly a heightened pleading standard at odds with the
Court’s gratuitous and emphatic pronouncement in Swierkiewicz that
a heightened pleading standard is impossible through judicial inter-
trict court that these allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to
raise an inference of discrimination.
To plead discrimination based on age, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
he is in the protected age group, (2) he is qualified for the job, (3) he was
discharged and (4) the discharge occurred under the circumstances giv-
ing rise to an inference of age discrimination.  The only circumstance
that Swierkiewicz alleges gives rise to an inference of age discrimination
is Chavel’s comment in 1995 that Chavel wanted to “energize” the un-
derwriting department.  We agree with the district court that this alle-
gation is insufficient as a matter of law to raise an inference of
discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
133. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 512 (2002) (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(a)(2)).
134. Id. at 512 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
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pretation.135  Summarily, Iqbal therefore is a heightening of the
pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), achieved via a methodology the Su-
preme Court concluded is barred by the separation of powers inherent
in the Rules Enabling Act.
Yet, in the seven years between Swierkiewicz and Iqbal, and with-
out any modification of the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court
somehow constitutionally raised the pleading standard.  One cannot
help but wonder whether the sudden difference of constitutional mus-
cle the Court affords itself is related to the fact that the post-Septem-
ber 11th plaintiff in Swierkiewicz was northern European while those
in Iqbal were Arab-Muslims, whose ethnicity was identical to the
group of people identified as posing a national security risk.136  Hope-
fully professor Sidhu, who demonstrates the similarities of Iqbal and
Korematsu, is incorrect.137  I doubt he is, but one can only hope.
In other words, the Swierkierwicz motion to dismiss argued that
facts merely consistent with discrimination were not enough to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss.138  Just as in Iqbal, the district and appel-
late courts accepted that argument in Swierkiewicz—the complaint
did not survive a motion to dismiss because other nondiscriminatory
reasons seemed more likely.139
135. See supra notes 117–125 and accompanying text.  Even more similarities prove
the sameness of the pleading standard rejected in Swierkiewicz and the standard
adopted as plausibility in Iqbal.  As previously described, much of the motion to
dismiss in Swierkiewicz sought dismissal because of the lack of facts permitting
an inference of discrimination. See supra notes 117–125 and accompanying text.
However, also contained in the motion to dismiss, and strikingly similar to the
comparative probabilities engaged in by the Iqbal court, is the argument that the
claim should be dismissed in the face of alternative reasons for the harm alleged
unless the plaintiff’s claim appears more probable. See infra section III.B (dis-
cussing plausibility as a comparative probability analysis); see also Swierkiewicz
Memo, supra note 110, at 9–13 (arguing for dismissal by referring to various con-
texts where the necessary inference of discrimination is impossible to achieve be-
cause reasons other than discrimination may exist for conduct apparently
consistent with discrimination).
136. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (noting that Al Qaeda, the
group at fault for September 11th, is a fundamentalist group of Arab-Muslim
members).
137. See Sidhu, supra note 43, at 505 (explaining Iqbal “has perpetuated the notion
that it is legally permissible for the government to rely solely on race, religion, or
national origin in the wartime context—an aspect of the case that it shares with
Korematsu and that has been extended by the lower courts to domestic law en-
forcement policies completely unrelated to wartime exigencies” (footnote
omitted)).
138. See Swierkiewicz Memo, supra note 110, at 9 (setting out many examples of cases
where the facts indicate there could possibly be discrimination based on behavior,
numerical disparities, etc., but the courts deem them insufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss because nothing in the complaint permits an inference of
discrimination).
139. See id. at 12–13.  The defendant gave examples of alternative explanations which
were considered in dismissing the complaint, stating:
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB201.txt unknown Seq: 21 30-NOV-11 7:07
2011] THE SCIENTIFIC IMPOSSIBILITY OF PLAUSIBILITY 455
While the Swierkiewicz complaint may have passed the
Twombly140 plausibility test, it would have failed under the Iqbal
standard which the lower courts applied in Swierkiewicz.  In other
words, even if it is possible to argue Swierkiewicz would have passed
the plausibility test after Twombly, the Swierkiewicz complaint would
be implausible according to Iqbal, despite its abundance of specific fac-
tual matter.  Stripped of what the Iqbal Court considers “legal conclu-
sions,” such as allegations of discrimination, the complaints in both
Conley and Swierkiewicz would be implausible because they only al-
lege facts consistent with discrimination.141  This alone, according to
Iqbal, does not allow a reasonable or plausible inference concerning
the theory of relief alleged by the plaintiff.142
The standard has indeed changed.  Commentators and courts alike
describe it as a change from the Conley conceivability standard to the
Twombly plausibility standard.143  In other words, Conley has long
been cited for the proposition that “a claim is well-pleaded [as long as]
it is logically consistent with a conceivable set of facts that could lead
to liability.”144 Twombly, on the other hand, has been interpreted as
holding that a complaint must provide “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.”145  This is in hopeless conflict
with Swierkiewicz.146  Likewise, professor Arthur Miller recently de-
scribed the plausibility pleading standard of Iqbal as a “notice-plus”
standard, which he explains is just another name for fact pleading.147
That Swierkiewicz was not discriminated against because of his age is
further confirmed by the fact that he was 43 years old when Sorema
hired him.  It is illogical that an employer who hires an employee when
he is a member of the protected age group would suddenly develop an
aversion to older people.
Id.  Additionally, the defendant provided an example where a“[plaintiff] was
hired by the [defendant] at the age of fifty six, a fact which undercuts any infer-
ence of age discrimination.” Id. at 13 (quoting and citing Suttell v. Mfrs. Hanover
Trust Co., 793 F. Supp. 70, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
140. See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text.
142. The lower court opinions in Swierkiewicz and the motion to dismiss, which was
granted in that case, clearly establish this. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 5
Fed. App’x 63, 64–65 (2001); Swierkiewicz Memo, supra note 110, at 8–10.
143. See, e.g., Manfred Gabriel, Twombly: A Journey from the Conceivable to the Plau-
sible, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2007, at 4.
144. Id.
145. Stephen R. Brown, Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited
Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1284 (2010) (using pro-
fessor Campbell’s own language: “a plaintiff must plead ‘factual allegations in
plain language touching (either directly or by inference) all material elements
necessary to recover under substantive law’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).
146. See supra notes 111–116 and accompanying text.
147. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 (2010).
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B. Mathematics
1. Plausibility as Bayesian Probability Analysis
If something is repeated enough, it is deemed true.  No truer exam-
ple of this cliche´ can be found than the following language from Iqbal:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defen-
dant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ”148
If plausibility were akin to a probability requirement, plausibility
would be abhorrent to the constitutionally based division of labor in
the federal court system149 because the judge, rather than the jury,
would be answering the question of whether or not the allegations in
the complaint are more likely accurate than not.150  In our civil litiga-
tion model, this more likely than not analysis is the exclusive province
of the jury.151  Judges are forbidden from engaging in this type of
analysis even at the summary judgment stage.152
The Court’s use of the term “possibility,” however, belies the asser-
tion that plausibility is not a probability analysis because possibility is
148. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citations omitted).
149. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1005–06 (“It
is unsurprising that Iqbal and Twombly both strenuously deny that they impose
a ‘probability’ requirement at the pleading stage.  Probability—at least in the
civil context—is typically understood as the province of the jury.  Probability
pleading would have been a true sea change in the division between judge and
jury.”).
150. Id. at 1006 (describing the enormous potential for the usurpation of the jury’s
function by the judge if plausibility was really equivalent to probability).
151. See Sidhu, supra note 43, at 489–90.  Professor Sidhu explains:
Assessing which set of facts is more likely to be true is not, however, a
proper function of a court at the motion to dismiss stage.  Indeed, pass-
ing judgment as to which version of facts is “more likely” is not even
appropriate at the summary judgment phase, where courts are charged
with determining whether “a reasonable jury” could agree with the non-
movant’s factual take on the case.  In fact, the Supreme Court has held
that in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, “[t]his Court’s ‘func-
tion is not [it]self to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ”  The
weighing of facts, however, is precisely what the Iqbal Court did—at the
motion to dismiss stage.
Doing so not only departs from established norms with respect to the
Court’s role in entertaining a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but arguably usurps
the duties of the fact-finder, whom the Supreme Court has acknowledged
is tasked with the responsibility to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to
weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.”  Plainly, the “factfinder’s role” is the “weigher of the
evidence.”  It may be the case that Iqbal does not have the factual sup-
port for his claims against Ashcroft and Mueller.  That is, however, a
determination that may not be made at the motion to dismiss stage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
152. Id.
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an expression of probability.  Mathematically, the probability of event
A is represented by a real number in the range from zero to one.153
An impossible event has a probability of zero and a certain event has a
probability of one.154  Stated another way, an impossible event has a
0% chance of happening and a certain event has a 100% chance of
happening.155  So an event is possible as long as it has a greater than
0% chance of happening, or a greater than zero probability.156
Therefore, for example, when the Iqbal Court concluded the plain-
tiff’s allegations—by being consistent with the theory of recovery al-
leged in the complaint—rendered the complaint “short of the line
between possibility and plausibility,”157 the Court’s necessary mathe-
matical conclusion is that the probability of discrimination is greater
than 0% but not probabilistically high enough to be plausible.  Plausi-
bility is therefore achieved when the complaint reaches a threshold
level of probability, but the Court does not define what this threshold
level of probability is.  An examination of probability theory is, how-
ever, instructive in defining where the plausibility threshold lies on
the zero to one probability range.158
The two main philosophies of probability theory are the Frequen-
tist and Bayesian models of probability.  Frequentist models are ill-
suited for use in the legal system because they involve computing
probability in idealized, non-real-world contexts,159 and they are inca-
pable of incorporating preexisting information into the decision pro-
cess.160  Frequentists explore the relative frequency of occurrence, or
probability of a random event, in a world of no variables and carefully
controlled or presupposed conditions.161  Bayesian probability analy-
153. See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 2362 (defin-
ing “probability” as “a measurable quantity the extent to which a particular event
is likely to occur, or a particular situation be the case, expressed by a number
between [zero] and [one] and commonly estimated by the ratio of the number of
favourable cases to the total number of all possible cases”).
154. See Harold P. Lehmann, Glossary, BAYESIAN COMMUNICATION, http://www.
hopkinsmedicine.org/Bayes/PrimaryPages/Glossary.cfm (last visited July 18,
2011).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007).
158. See infra subsection III.B.1.
159. E.T. JAYNES, PROBABILITY THEORY: THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE xiii (G. Larry
Bretthorst ed., 2002); see also JAMES O. BERGER, STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY
AND BAYESIAN ANALYSIS 74 (2d. ed. 1985) (comparing the shortcomings of the “fre-
quency concept” of probability with the suitability of Bayesian or subjective
probability to real-world situations where idealized experimental conditions do
not exist).
160. JAYNES, supra note 159, at xiii.
161. Id.  Perhaps professor Rhee was referring only to frequentist probability ap-
proaches when he commented on the inapplicability of statistical probability to
litigation without acknowledging the existence of Bayesian probability.  Robert J.
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sis, by contrast, is an approach to statistics which “formally seeks to
utilize prior information.”162  It is a probabilistic model which closely
approximates litigation to the extent it seeks to arrive at an inference
based on existing information.163  Bayesian probability, like legal in-
ference, essentially seeks to process information in a manner that
yields the most optimal inferences based on the information.164
Additionally, the term plausible inference is recognized in the “con-
cepts, methods and solution practices” of Bayesian probability.165  If
something seems logical to a human being it is plausible under Baye-
sian theory.166  The following illustration of Bayesian plausible rea-
soning perfectly demonstrates the similarity between Bayesian
plausibility and the plausibility referred to in Iqbal:
Suppose some dark night a policeman walks down a street, apparently de-
serted; but suddenly he hears a burglar alarm, looks across the street, and
sees a jewelry store with a broken window.  Then a gentleman wearing a mask
comes crawling out through the broken window, carrying a bag which turns
out to be full of expensive jewelry.  The policeman doesn’t hesitate at all in
deciding that this gentleman is dishonest.  But by what reasoning process
does he arrive at this conclusion?167
The policeman’s conclusion of dishonesty is plausible because there is
a certain threshold value of validity, or probability, to it.168  When
Bayesian modelers make an inference about an event’s probability or
Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settle-
ment and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 650 (2006).
162. See BERGER, supra note 159, at 3.
163. See JAYNES, supra note 159, at xv (indicating the utility of Bayesian probability in
legal research since it is “telling us something about the way our own minds oper-
ate when we form intuitive judgments”); see also Herman Bruyninckx, Bayesian
Probability 2 (Nov. 2002) (unpublished article) (on file with author and Nebraska
Law Review) (explaining the relevance of Bayesian probability to court decisions
and using “reasoning in court decisions” as an example of Bayesian probability
application).
164. JAYNES, supra note 159, at xiv (explaining Bayesian probability is a means of
obtaining optimal inferences based on preexisting information).  This is analo-
gous to a jury conclusion based on evidence.
165. Bruyninckx, supra note 163, at 1.
166. Id. at 3.
167. JAYNES, supra note 159, at 1.
168. Id.  Jaynes explains her point, stating:
A moment’s thought makes it clear that our policeman’s conclusion
was not a logical deduction from the evidence; for there may have been a
perfectly innocent explanation for everything.  It might be, for example,
that this gentleman was the owner of the jewelry store and he was com-
ing home from a masquerade party, and didn’t have the key with him.
But just as he walked by his store a passing truck threw a stone through
the window; and he was only protecting his own property.  Now while
the policeman’s reasoning process was not logical deduction, we will
grant that it had a certain degree of validity.  The evidence did not make
the gentleman’s dishonesty certain, but it did make it extremely
plausible.
Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB201.txt unknown Seq: 25 30-NOV-11 7:07
2011] THE SCIENTIFIC IMPOSSIBILITY OF PLAUSIBILITY 459
plausibility, they do so based on prior knowledge about that event.169
Bayesians assign probabilities to the prior events and use these as-
signed probabilities to predict the validity or plausibility of a hypothe-
sis to explain previously unobserved events.170
Mathematically, Baye’s rule is expressed as:
P (DH) P(H)171
P(HD) =
P(D)
“P(H) is the prior probability of H: the probability that H is correct before
the data D are seen.”172
“P(DH) is the conditional probability of seeing the data D given that the
hypothesis H is true.  This conditional probability is called the
likelihood.”173
“P(D) is the marginal probability of D.”174
“P(HD) is the posterior probability: the probability that the hypothesis is
true, given the data and the previous state of belief about the
hypothesis.”175
Analogized to Iqbal, the Court’s probability estimation of discrimina-
tion against Muslims by Ashcroft and Mueller before seeing data in
the form of allegations in the complaint was the equivalent of P(H).
169. See Bayesian Statistics, RELIASOFT CORP., http://www.weibull.com/LifeDataWeb/
bayesian_statistics.htm (last visited July 18, 2010) (“The premise of Bayesian
statistics (within the context of life data analysis) is to incorporate prior knowl-
edge, along with a given set of current observations, in order to make statistical
inferences.”).
170. Bruno A. Olshausen, Bayesian Probability Theory 1–2 (March 1, 2004) (unpub-
lished article) (on file with author and Nebraska Law Review).  Olshausen states:
Bayes’ rule really involves nothing more than the manipulation of
conditional probabilities.  Remember that the joint probability of two
events, A&B, can be expressed as P(AB) = P(AB)P(B) = P(BA)P(A).
In Bayesian probability theory, one of these “events” is the hypothe-
sis, H, and the other is data, D, and we wish to judge the relative truth of
the hypothesis given the data.  According to Bayes’ rule, we do this via
the relation P(HD) = P(DH)P(H) P(D).
The term P(DH) is called the likelihood function and it assesses the
probability of the observed data arising from the hypothesis.  Usually
this is known by the experimenter, as it expresses one’s knowledge of
how one expects the data to look given that the hypothesis is true.  The
term P(H) is called the prior, as it reflects one’s prior knowledge before
the data are considered.
Id.; see also JAYNES, supra note 159, at xiv (explaining Bayesian analysis as “ex-
pressing some prior knowledge or some working hypothesis about the phenome-
non being observed”).
171. See Olshausen, supra note 170, at 1.
172. Bayesian Probability, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_probabil
ity (last modified June 16, 2011, 9:09 AM).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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The new data, or (D), in support of the hypothesis was the allegations
in the complaint.  The hypothesis to be tested was whether or not
there was discrimination.  If we represent the hypothesis of discrimi-
nation as (Discr.) and the data in support of the hypothesis (allega-
tions in the complaint) as (Alleg.), then the proper mathetical rule for
the Bayes rule in the Iqbal case is:
P (Alleg.Discr.) P(Discr.)176
P (Discr.Alleg.) =
P. (Alleg.)
We may remove P. (Alleg.) from the equation since it “usually plays
the role of an ignorable normalizing constant.”177  The equation would
now read:
P(Discr.Alleg.) = P (Alleg.Discr.) P(Discr.)
P(Alleg.Discr.) is an expression of what data or allegations the judge
would expect to be present if the hypothesis of discrimination was
true.178  This is usually known by the modeler because it expresses
how the modeler expects data to look if a hypothesis is true.179
Bayesian modeling recognizes that this probability function,
P(Alleg.Discr.), which expresses the likelihood the observed data (al-
legations) are due to the hypothesis (discrimination), must be quali-
fied or discounted by the subjective state of the modeler’s knowledge.
For example, a lay person on a sunny day with no clouds in sight
might say that the chance or probability of rain later in the day—
given the state of the atmosphere—is low, and he or she might express
this belief as a 30% chance of rain or .3 on the probability scale.180
However, assume the person sees a weather forecast after expressing
the probability of rain.  The forecast shows a satellite picture of the
area indicating rain clouds approaching, and the meteorologist claims
there is a very good chance of rain later in the day.  After the forecast,
the lay person would likely raise the probability of rain later in the
day to 80% or .8, for example.181  The weather forecast would be the
equivalent of Bayesian data, represented by Alleg. in the equation
above.182
176. See Olshausen, supra note 170, at 1–2.
177. Id. at 2.
178. See id. at 1.  Not surprisingly, this expected data would include disparate treat-
ment and detention of individuals based on race and ethnicity, which was present
in the allegations of the Iqbal complaint.
179. See id.
180. DENNIS V. LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY 43 (2006).
181. Id.
182. Id.; see also Olshausen, supra note 170, at 1–2 (explaining the Bayesian
probability theory).
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In other words, the Court’s estimate of the probability that any al-
legations consistent with discrimination are actually caused by dis-
crimination,183 or P(Alleg.Discr.), must be qualified by an expression
of the Court’s state of knowledge before the allegations in the com-
plaint were added to the Court’s knowledge base.  That prior
probability of discrimination, given the Court’s state of knowledge
before the allegations in the Iqbal complaint, is represented by
P(Discr.) in the equation above.184  In terms of Iqbal, P(Discr.) repre-
sents what the Court thinks the probability of Ashcroft and Mueller
discriminating against Muslims was before the Court considered the
new data in the form of post-September 11th allegations made by
Muslim detainees in the complaint.
P(Discr.Alleg.) represents the new probability of discrimination in
light of the new data in the complaint, (Alleg.), and processed in light
of the knowledge of the Court before the new data was introduced.
The probability of discrimination, P(Discr.), therefore represents the
old or prior probability of discrimination based on the Court’s state of
knowledge if the new data in the complaint was not considered.185
Bayes rule therefore represents “learning” in that the change in
probabilities before and after data, or from P(Discr.) to
P(Discr.Alleg.), represents a transformation from the prior state of
knowledge to the posterior state of knowledge when considering the
new data discovered.186  Bayesian mathematicians thus refer to
P(Discr.) as the prior distribution and to P(Discr.Alleg.) as the poste-
rior distribution.187
This is the exactly what judges, and for that matter juries, do—
even if it is done unconsciously.188  Much like the layperson in the
rain example, they apply their common sense to the evidence, reevalu-
ating the probability of certain events as more and more data in the
form of evidence is presented.189  This process is called plausible rea-
183. Remember discrimination is not the only thing that can result in what could be
considered allegations indicative of discrimination.  For example, in medical sci-
ence it is possible that a symptom of a disease is not caused by the disease. See
LINDLEY, supra note 180, at 84.  Chest pain, for example, could be caused by sore
muscles as well as cardiac problems. See id.  In Iqbal for example, the judge was
deciding whether or not the data (disparate treatment based on race) was due to
discrimination or to another legal cause. See infra notes 199–200 and accompa-
nying text.
184. See Olshausen, supra note 170, at 1–2.
185. See id. at 2.
186. See id.
187. See BERGER, supra note 159, at 75, 126 (explaining the meaning of prior and pos-
terior distributions).
188. JAYNES, supra note 159, at 3.
189. Id.
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soning, and it is precisely a Bayesian comparative probability
analysis.190
Yet, despite its insistence to the contrary, the Supreme Court en-
gages in this comparative Bayesian probability analysis when assess-
ing a complaint’s plausibility.  For example, the Twombly Court first
explains that parallel conduct may be consistent with conspiracy.191
It then concludes: “but here we have an obvious alternative explana-
tion. . . . Hence, a natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged
is that the former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting
tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.”192
It is the presence of these “obvious” and “natural” explanations
which render conspiracy, the other possible explanation adduced by
the plaintiff in his complaint,193 implausible.  Despite the existence of
two possible theories, the Court purportedly has the ability to discern
at the pleading stage that one theory is so much more “natural and
obvious” that the Court feels justified in foreclosing the development
of evidence concerning the other possible conspiracy theory.  The
Court is clearly employing a Bayesian model to determine which of the
possible reasons for the behavior of the telecommunications compa-
nies is the more logical explanation.194
Likewise, in Iqbal, the Court did not reject the allegation of dis-
crimination as impossible or having a probability of zero.195  Instead,
like in Twombly, the Court felt the existence of another possible cause,
which it describes as an “obvious alternative explanation,” rendered
the plaintiff’s theory of recovery implausible.196
190. Id.  Jaynes described probability reasoning as follows:
[T]he brain, in doing plausible reasoning, not only decides whether
something becomes more plausible or less plausible, but it evaluates the
degree of plausibility in some way.  The plausibility for rain by 10 AM
depends very much on the darkness of those clouds at 9:45.  And the
brain makes use of old information as well as the specific new data of the
problem; in deciding what to do we try to recall our past experience with
clouds and rain, and what the weatherman predicted last night.
Id.
191. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 554 (2007) (explaining that parallel
conduct may be consistent with conspiracy and stating “[t]he inadequacy of show-
ing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of
the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide
swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by
common perceptions of the market” (emphasis added)).
192. Id. at 567–68.
193. See id.
194. See Bruyninckx, supra note 163, at 3 (explaining plausibility in Bayesian statis-
tics is a measure of the extent to which a conclusion appears logical to a human).
195. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).  “To be clear, we do not reject
these bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical.” Id.
at 1951.
196. Id. at 1951–52 (“On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw
were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens
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In Twombly, the Court carefully and deliberately fails to conclude
“natural” reasons are more likely to explain the defendants’ behavior
than conspiracy.197  In Iqbal the Court felt that both discrimination
and nondiscrimination were possible explanations for the harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff, but the Court made a decision at the pleading
stage to deny the plaintiff access to discovery because it was able to
determine the harm was “likely” caused by nondiscriminatory
motivations.198
Iqbal concludes nondiscriminatory reasons were likely enough a
cause of the disparate treatment of Arab men to deny discovery on
another admittedly possible cause: discrimination.199  This illustrates
that the plausibility analysis involves comparing the likelihoods or
probabilities of discriminatory and the nondiscriminatory explana-
tions.  The relevant language in Iqbal explains, where complaints
such as the Iqbal and Twombly complaints “plead[ ] facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’”200
Mathematically then, if we represent the probability of a nondis-
criminatory reason being the source of the data or allegations in the
complaint as P(NonDiscr.), the Court performed at least the following
two Bayesian analyses:
P(Discr.Alleg.) = P(Alleg.Discr)P(Discr.)
and
P(NonDiscr.Alleg) = P(NonDiscr.Alleg.)P(NonDiscr.)
After performing both of these, the Court ultimately concluded
P(NonDiscr.Alleg) was greater than P(Discr.Alleg), or the observed
data was less likely to be caused by nondiscriminatory reasons than
by discriminatory reasons.201
The Supreme Court’s encouraged use of “judicial experience and
common sense”202 to determine plausibility also convincingly demon-
strates it engaged in Bayesian probability analysis even if it did not
consciously utilize the above mathematical formulae.  According to
who were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connec-
tions to those who committed terrorist acts.  As between that “obvious alternative
explanation” for the arrests, and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respon-
dent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567)).
197. If the court had openly stated this, the aforementioned problems of judicial en-
croachment on the constitutional landscape reserved for the jury would render
plausibility instantly invalid. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
198. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52 (concluding the arrests were “likely lawful”).
199. See id.
200. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
201. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text (explaining the comparative
likelihoods involved in the Iqbal case).
202. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (emphasis added).
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professor Jaynes, when describing Bayesian plausibility, “in our rea-
soning we depend very much on prior information to help us in evalu-
ating the degree of plausibility in a new problem.  This reasoning
process goes on unconsciously, almost instantaneously, and we con-
ceal how complicated it really is by calling it common sense.”203
In the context of litigation, professor Jaynes demonstrates: “Even
in situations where we would be quite unable to say that numerical
values should be used, Bayes’ theorem still reproduces qualitatively
just what your common sense (after perhaps some meditation) tells
you.”204  Professor Arthur Miller, in his recent piece, agrees that plau-
sibility analysis involves comparative probability considerations, ex-
plaining “plausibility . . . depend[s] on the relative likelihood that
legally actionable conduct occurred versus a hypothesized innocent ex-
planation.”205  Professor Malveaux likewise concludes that establish-
ing plausibility necessarily entails a probability analysis.206
The Third Circuit also does an excellent job of demonstrating that
comparative probability analysis is a necessary component of estab-
lishing plausibility, or the reasonableness of an inference:
The line is drawn by the laws of logic.  If there is an experience of logical
probability that an ultimate fact will follow a stated narrative or historical
fact, then the jury is given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because there
is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the proven facts.207
Whether a judge thinks an event or explanation is more plausible
or probable than another in light of the allegations is not usually prob-
lematic.  The judge is human and will naturally and involuntarily so
conclude in any situation where competing inferences can be drawn.
A problem develops, however, when a judge or court forecloses consid-
eration of one inference based on its belief regarding the greater
203. JAYNES, supra note 159, at 3.
204. Id. at 146.
205. See Miller, supra note 147, at 26.
206. See Suzette Malveaux, Front Loading And Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Dis-
covery can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 65, 83–84, 85 (2010).  In this piece, professor Malveauz further
states that instead of clarifying the meaning of plausibility in relation to possibil-
ity post-Twombly, Iqbal’s analysis suggests the applicability of probability is the
following:
In comparing the plaintiff’s intentional discrimination thesis to the more
innocent one, the Court finds plaintiff’s explanation wanting and there-
fore not plausible.  Although the Court denies that the plausibility stan-
dard is a probability one, the Court openly compares plaintiff’s theory of
the case to other theories, judges them relative to one another, and re-
jects plaintiff’s as implausible because of the unlikelihood of its occur-
rence.  Justice Souter—the author of Twombly—identifies the Court’s
conflation of plausibility and probability in Iqbal as a “fundamental mis-
understanding of the enquiry that Twombly demands.”
Id. at 83–84 (emphasis added).
207. Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987).
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probability of one inference over another.  This is exactly what the Su-
preme Court did in making its plausibility determination.208
A finding of implausibility in Iqbal and Twombly means the Court
concluded—based on its own common sense, judgment, and experi-
ence,209—that it is impossible for a reasonable person to conclude dis-
crimination and conspiracy were more likely than not the cause of the
harm to the plaintiffs.210  In essence, because possibility is a measure
of probability, plausibility analysis requires that two events occur si-
multaneously, even though their concurrence is mathematically im-
possible when comparing relative possibilities and avoiding
probability determinations.
2. Locating Plausibility on the Zero-to-One Probability Scale
i. Plausibility is no Higher than .51 on the Zero-to-One
Probability Scale
Having established the plausibility calculus is a probability deter-
mination, plausibility must then represent a point somewhere on the
zero-to-one probability scale.  Moreover, because allegations “merely
consistent with” a defendant’s liability indicate possibility, but “[stop]
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief,’ ” plausibility then represents a finding that the probability of
an event is higher on the zero-to-one probability scale than mere pos-
sibility.211  Further, since an event is possible if the probability of it
occurring is greater than zero,212 the exact value represented by plau-
sibility potentially falls anywhere from greater than zero to less than
one, and it may seem impossible to quantify.213  However, a combina-
tion of the accepted parameters of the civil justice system’s burden of
208. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010).
There, Judge Posner opines that:
The Court said in Iqbal that the “plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  This is a little unclear because
plausibility, probability, and possibility overlap.  Probability runs the
gamut from a zero likelihood to a certainty.  What is impossible has a
zero likelihood of occurring and what is plausible has a moderately high
likelihood of occurring.
Id. at 629 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
209. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“Determining whether a com-
plaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.”).
210. See infra subsection III.B.2.b (explaining the plausibility consideration in terms
of the more likely than not standard of proof).
211. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
557 (2007)).
212. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
213. Perhaps this is what the Supreme Court intended.
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proof, the jurisprudence of judgment as a matter of law, and the lan-
guage of the Iqbal decision permits a precise determination of where
plausibility lies within the 0%–100% range of potential probabilities.
The ultimate burden of proof in the civil justice system, with few
exceptions not relevant here, is the preponderance of the evidence
standard.  It requires nothing more than having a plaintiff prove the
events described in the complaint are more likely than not, or “that
the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexis-
tence.”214  All this standard requires is that plaintiffs prove the events
alleged in support of recovery have a greater probability that they oc-
curred than the probability that they did not.215  In the civil system,
full recovery is allowed as long as the jury concludes the probability or
likelihood of the events alleged is greater than .5.216  On a percentage
scale, therefore, the ultimate burden in the civil trial is met by the
plaintiff proving there is a greater than 50% chance the events de-
scribed in the complaint occurred.217  For the mathematical conve-
nience of working with integers, this threshold may be represented by
a probability of 51%.
Requiring a probability greater than 51% to satisfy the plausibility
standard would establish a reductio ad absurdum because it would
mean plaintiffs must satisfy a higher standard of probability at the
pleading stage than what is required in order to ultimately prevail in
a civil trial—after they have been given the opportunity to develop
evidence and testimony in support of their allegations.218  So, in terms
of locating plausibility on the probability scale, one necessary conclu-
sion is that plausibility can be no higher than 51% probability.
ii. Plausibility is a More Likely than not Analysis
Iqbal requires a reasonable inference for plausibility.219  The
meaning of reasonable inference is well developed in the jurispru-
214. Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance of
the Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983).
215. See id. at 1162 (explaining the standard in light of an industrial accident).
216. See id. at 1159 (discussing the criticism of full recovery being allowed as long as
the likelihood of plaintiff’s case is only slightly greater than 50% whereas no re-
covery is allowed when it is slightly less).
217. This of course assumes the complaints are elementally complete, recite every ele-
ment of the cause of action, and proof was developed on every issue.  The Iqbal
and Twombly complaints were elementally complete in that the Court noted the
complaints all contained the necessary elements for discrimination and conspir-
acy claims respectively. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009).
218. See Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 214 (describing the ultimate burden of proof in
the civil justice system).
219. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (clarifying the meaning of plausibility as “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged” (emphasis added)).
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dence of “judgment as a matter of law.”  Combining Iqbal’s language
with the meaning of reasonable inference reveals plausibility is virtu-
ally indistinguishable from a more likely than not analysis.  This is
because plausibility is located at .51 on the zero-to-one probability
scale, or very close to it.
Initially, Rule 50’s title was changed from “Directed Verdict” to
“Judgment as a Matter of Law” to reflect the identity of the Rule 50
standard with the second prong of the summary judgment standard
within Rule 56.220  Rule 56 requires, initially, that there be no genu-
ine issue of material fact, and further that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.221  However, judgment as a matter of
law is, according to Rule 50, appropriate when a judge determines a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to
find for the nonmoving party after the party is fully heard on an
issue.222
Professor Suja Thomas describes the cliche´d role of the judge in
determining whether or not to grant judgment as a matter of law:
[T]he judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistaka-
bly favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a
verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.  The Court also stated that
the facts of the [nonmoving party] were to be taken as true, and “justifiable
inferences” were to be drawn for the [nonmoving party].223
Recent scholarship has challenged the possibility concerning the
purported dichotomy224 of the judge’s role at summary judgment.
Professor Gordillo, for example, argues that it is impossible for a judge
to determine whether a party could satisfy the ultimate burden of pro-
duction without weighing the evidence.225  He explains that the judge
220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s notes on 1991 amendments (“The
revision abandons the familiar terminology of direction of verdict . . .[and judg-
ment as a matter of law] call[ing] attention to the relationship between [Rule 50
and Rule 56, and] serves to link the two provisions.”); see also Suja A. Thomas,
The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss under Iqbal and
Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 39 (2010) (reiterating the Supreme
Court has adopted the same standard for summary judgment and for judgment
as a matter of law).
221. See, e.g., Mosley v. City of Chicago, 614 F.3d 391, 396 n.1 (2010).
222. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).
223. Thomas, supra note 220, at 21 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
272, 252 (1986)).
224. See id. (explaining the purported dichotomy).
225. Gregory A. Gordillo, Summary Judgment and Problems in Applying the Celotex
Summary Judgment Standard, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 263, 276–77 (1994).  Profes-
sor Gordillo explained:
The Anderson Court stated that a “judge’s function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to deter-
mine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”  In other words, a judge
must evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence without weighing its credi-
bility. Perhaps courts silently decide whether the movant has carried his
burden of persuasion because the court must avoid the appearance of
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at summary judgment does not merely decide whether a reasonable
jury could find the more likely than not standard satisfied, but that
the judge actually decides whether the more likely than not standard
is met.226
Even more recently, professor Thomas argues that when deciding
judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment motions, judges
“do indeed decide whether they could find for the plaintiff or whether
they think that the evidence is sufficient, not whether a reasonable
jury could find for the plaintiff or whether a reasonable jury could
think that the evidence is sufficient.”227  She bases her findings on
three principles.  The first is that when judges purport to be applying
the reasonable juror standard they often explain why they think the
evidence is insufficient but not why it is sufficient.228  Second, she ar-
gues the reasonable juror standard is incapable of definition.229  Fi-
nally, she explains how different judges come to different conclusions
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence when applying the indefina-
ble reasonable jury standard.230  It is beyond the scope of this Article
to fully explore whether or not the judge is deliberately weighing the
evidence at the summary judgment stage.  However, when the judg-
ment as a matter of law process is examined empirically, the distinc-
tion between assessing sufficiency and weighing evidence appears
illusory.231
It is not necessary to directly accuse the judiciary of usurpation in
order to agree with professor Thomas’s ultimate conclusion about illu-
sory dichotomies.  A probabilistic perspective reveals the same result.
Using the language of the Rules, when a judge grants summary judg-
ment or judgment as a matter of law, he or she concludes no reasona-
ble juror could find the nonmoving party can satisfy the burden of
weighing the evidence before it.  Anderson requires the judge to deter-
mine whether the evidence can persuade a reasonable jury.  Celotex re-
quires the judge to determine whether the evidence persuades the judge.
Thus, an inherent difficulty in the summary judgment standard is that,
in theory, courts must determine whether a party has produced suffi-
cient evidence to satisfy the burden of production without considering
the persuasiveness of the evidence produced.  This is an impossibility.
Id.
226. Id.
227. Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 760
(2009).
228. Id. at 760.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 760–61.  Interestingly, this defect in dichotomy between oneself and the
reasonable person is not unique to summary judgment jurisprudence; it haunts
the jurisprudence of negligence as well.  Instructing jurors not to define reasona-
ble based on what they would have done, but rather based on the objective stan-
dard of “the reasonable person,” is perhaps a fiction with which the law is
comfortable living.  But indeed it is a fiction.
231. See generally id.
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proof.232  This means the judge concludes there is no chance a reason-
able juror could find for the non-moving party.  If something has no
chance of occurring, it is impossible, or it has a probability of zero.233
Therefore, judgment as a matter of law must be denied if a reason-
able juror could possibly make the inference necessary for the non-
moving party to satisfy its burden of proof.  Denying judgment as a
matter of law is only permissible when there is no chance a reasonable
juror could make the required inference.234  The necessary inference
is unreasonable “[whenever] it is apparent that [the nonmoving party]
is unable to carry a burden of proof.”235  So an inference is reasonable
if it is possible the nonmoving party will be able to carry the 51% bur-
den of proof.236  In other words, judgment as a matter of law must be
denied if the probability of a reasonable juror finding the nonmoving
party’s version of events as more likely than not is greater than zero.
Or, in other words, if it is possible.
There are only two ways judges can determine whether an infer-
ence is reasonable, or if possible, whether a reasonable juror would
make the necessary inference.  They either substitute their version of
reasonableness for the reasonable juror’s, as professor Thomas sug-
gests, or they can actually locate the metaphysical reasonable juror
and channel that person through themselves in the same manner a
medium might channel the dead.  The former is impermissible accord-
ing to the Seventh Amendment; the latter—and its required level of
dissociation—has not been proven possible.  How else can a judge de-
cide what “the,” or for that matter, “a” reasonable juror would find
impossible to infer based on the evidence?
If a judge, in denying judgment as a matter of law, is not substitut-
ing his or her own experiences for those of the reasonable juror, the
necessary implication is that the judge has examined the fictional rea-
sonable person, or all fictional reasonable people, and concluded that
at least one reasonable person would believe the nonmoving party sat-
isfied the burden of proof based on the evidence, even if the judge
would not so believe.  This must be true; if the chance or probability of
232. Judgment as a matter of law reflects a determination by a court that the nonmov-
ing party is unable to carry its burden of proof. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory
committee’s notes on 1991 amendments.  Judgment as a matter of law should be
denied if, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could make the inference
sought by the nonmoving party.  See id. (instructing courts to disregard legally
insufficient, evidentiary bases in determining the propriety of granting judgment
as a matter of law).
233. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text (explaining the meaning of possi-
bility and probability).
234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s notes on 1991 amendments.
235. Id.
236. See Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 214 (explaining the burden of proof in civil
trials).
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a reasonable person believing is zero, no reasonable person would so
believe and summary judgment must be granted.237
Therefore, the statement that a reasonable person could believe
the nonmoving party—or draw the inference required to conclude the
burden of proof is satisfied—means it is not impossible for a reasona-
ble person to make the necessary inference or form a probabilistic per-
spective; the probability of a reasonable person so inferring is greater
than zero.  The judge therefore is necessarily concluding (whether con-
sciously or not) that given a sufficiently large sample size, a reasona-
ble person somewhere within the confines of the universe could make
the necessary inferences based on the evidence such that he or she
would conclude the nonmoving party’s case is more likely than not.
By concluding that a reasonable juror would so infer, the judge has in
fact concluded the inference the nonmoving party seeks is more likely
than not, at least for that reasonable juror.
Because, in order to find an inference reasonable, a judge must
conclude that at least one reasonable juror could find it more likely
than not, a reasonable inference is the same as the more likely than
not standard for that reasonable person.  According to Iqbal, plausibil-
ity is the equivalent of a reasonable inference.238  At least for one rea-
sonable jury, plausibility is the equivalent of more likely than not, or
its minimal location is .51 on the probability scale.
The more similar the actual jurors are to the hypothetical reasona-
ble person, the more closely plausibility approaches a finding of more
likely than not.  In any event, the extreme similarity of plausibility to
a conclusion of more likely than not should be sufficient to give one a
pause in examining whether a judge should really do this type of anal-
ysis at the pleading stage.
Since reasonableness of an allegation, a fact, a legal theory, etc.,—
wherever else reasonableness is used in the context of the Federal
Rules—means the possibility of concluding its existence is more likely
than not, it is “implausible” to assume reasonableness means some-
thing else in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the Iqbal
Court clearly states that plausibility exists only when a reasonable
inference is possible.239
Plausibility therefore means the Court concludes after examining
the pleadings that it is possible a juror could conclude the alleged the-
ory is possibly more likely than not the cause of the harm suffered.
Even if determining the reasonableness of an inference does not in-
237. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is such that no reasonable
juror could find for the nonmoving party. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
238. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
239. Id. at 1949 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual con-
tent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
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volve a complete usurpation of the jury’s function by the judge, it is
indeed enough usurpation that it should cause concern.  The identity,
or at least extreme proximity of plausibility to .51 on the probability
scale, means that plausibility is exactly, or very similar to, a more
likely than not analysis.
3. Plausibility’s Impropriety at Pleading and Propriety at
Summary Judgment
The Court’s plausibility calculus resulting in dismissal without dis-
covery illustrates a preexisting concern about Bayesian probability
theory.  Recall the Bayesian equation representing the plausibility
analysis in Iqbal:
P(Discr.Alleg.) = P(Alleg.Discr.)P(Discr.)240
Also recall that P(Discr.) is referred to as the prior distribution or
prior probability, and P(Discr.Alleg) is referred to as the posterior
distribution or probability.241  Clearly the more knowledge the judge
has about discrimination before the data in the complaint (P(Alleg.))
are introduced equates to more confidence we should place upon the
judge’s estimation of the probability of discrimination
(P(Discr.Alleg.)) in light of the new data introduced.  Again recall the
example of the lay person predicting rainfall.242  The person has more
knowledge on which to calculate the probability of rain, and we are
more confident their prediction is correct, when the person has more
information after the weather forecast.243
Therefore in the equation above, the more knowledge we impute to
the judge before the data in the complaint are introduced, the smaller
the difference between P(Discr.), or the probability of discrimination
before the data are introduced, and P(Discr.Alleg.), or the probability
of discrimination after the evidence is considered.
One of the criticisms of Bayesian probability is the subjectivity of
assigning the prior state of knowledge used to calculate P (Discr).244
In reality, without absolute knowledge, the modeler cannot determine
if he or she is overlooking knowledge which would affect plausibility if
known,245 in much the same way a judge—or jury for that matter—is
240. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
244. See BERGER, supra note 159, at 125 (“The most frequent criticism of Bayesian
analysis is that different reasonable priors will often yield different answers [re-
sulting in] a supposedly unappealing lack of objectivity.”).
245. See Bruyninckx, supra note 163, at 21 (“Assigning equivalent probabilities for
equivalent states seems to assume that the modeller has ‘absolute
knowledge . . . .’ ”).
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incapable of concluding for or against a party without evidence unless
the sought-after conclusion is obviously one with zero probability.246
By stressing the use of common sense and experience as the plausi-
bility decision does, the Court appears to assign a higher knowledge
state to the posterior distribution P(Discr.) such that the difference
between P(Discr.) and P(Discr.Alleg.) becomes smaller.  In this way,
the conclusion of implausibility becomes a foregone conclusion because
the more knowledge we assign to the prior distribution then the more
similar to the posterior distribution it will be.  For example, if a judge
is omniscient, then P(Discr.) equates to P(Discr.Alleg.) because the
data introduced in the complaint would not change the state of the
judge’s knowledge such that there is no Bayesian learning or differ-
ence between prior and posterior probabilities.247  Neither judges nor
juries are omniscient, but one thing is certain: whether we are predict-
ing rainfall or making a legal inference, the more information a judge
or jury possesses, the more confidence we can have in their ultimate
inference, which is an estimation of probability, as previously
demonstrated.
This correlation between knowledge and correctness is presumably
the reason discovery exists.  Discovery facilitates the litigation
equivalent of the modeler—the judge and, if necessary, the jury—in
obtaining the information necessary to actually determine the plausi-
bility of an event.  This is especially troubling in light of the fact dis-
crimination and conspiracy were definitely not zero-probability events
in Iqbal and Twombly.248
This significant difference between determining reasonable infer-
ences without evidence at the pleading stage via plausibility, on the
one hand, and reasonable inferences after evidence (knowledge) is
presented and developed by adversarial parties, on the other, is over-
looked by scholars such as professor Hartnett who claim plausibility is
not a radical departure from previous litigation norms.249  According
to professor Hartnett, “[t]he need to rely on experience and common
sense in drawing inferences is hardly radical—it is a staple of induc-
tive reasoning, which in turn is at the heart of our system of adjudica-
tion.”250  Although professor Hartnett is correct, he fails to distinguish
246. See supra subsection III.A.1 (describing inferences which may be judicially no-
ticed as impossible).
247. See BERGER, supra note 159, at 75, 126 (explaining the meaning of prior and pos-
terior distributions).
248. See supra notes 191–94 (discussing the fact that discrimination and conspiracy in
Iqbal and Twombly were not zero probability or impossible events).
249. Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly even after Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473
(2010).
250. Id. at 498 (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 554,
567–68 (2007)).  Professor Hartnett also quotes professor Twinings, who has sum-
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between the propriety of common sense or inductive reasoning at the
motion to dismiss stage and at the summary judgment stage.
The two motions occur in very different contexts, and the applica-
bility of common sense and experience at the pleading stage is much
more offensive to adversarial justice than at summary judgment.251
In summary judgment, for example, the parties have typically gener-
ated evidence in support of their claims.252  When a judge applies
common sense and judicial experience in the summary judgment con-
text, it is analogous to applying icing to a cake.  But judicial common
sense and experience in the motion to dismiss context is akin to bak-
ing the entire cake in that it occupies an exponentially larger propor-
tion of the decision-making consideration because no evidence is
developed at the pleading stage.
marized some of the common assumptions underlying our rationalist model of
adjudication as follows:
The establishment of the truth of alleged facts in adjudication is typi-
cally a matter of probabilities, falling short of absolute cer-
tainty. . . . Judgments about the probabilities of allegations about
particular past events can and should be reached by reasoning from rele-
vant evidence presented to the decision maker . . . . The characteristic
mode of reasoning appropriate to reason about probabilities is induc-
tion. . . . Judgments about probabilities have, generally speaking, to be
based on the available stock of knowledge about the common course of
events; this is largely a matter of common sense supplemented by spe-
cialized scientific or expert knowledge when it is available.
Id.
251. Thomas, supra note 220, at 39–41.  Professor Thomas states that:
Discovery has occurred under summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law, as opposed to under the motion to dismiss.  As a result,
the same evidence is presented under summary judgment and judgment
as a matter of law, though sometimes in different forms, for example,
live witnesses under judgment as a matter of law versus documentary
evidence under summary judgment.  In contrast, none of this same evi-
dence is available for the motion to dismiss.  It seems likely then that
under the plausibility standard, motions to dismiss may be granted
inappropriately in at least some cases where facts may be discovered
that would make the claim plausible under a summary judgment
motion . . . .
In addition to differences in rule construction and cost justification,
summary judgment and the motion to dismiss are dissimilar based on
the role of the courts, though both motions, as stated previously, in-
crease the role of courts in litigation.  At the summary judgment stage,
courts examine the evidence developed by the parties to determine
whether the claim is plausible.  On the other hand, at the motion to dis-
miss stage, courts have only the facts set forth in the complaint to deter-
mine whether the claim is plausible.  This type of inquiry at the pleading
stage gives the courts themselves more power over the parties than at
the summary judgment stage where the parties themselves have devel-
oped the evidence in the cases, which the courts use to decide the
motions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
252. Id. at 41.
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In the summary judgment scenario, there is an evidentiary base to
which the judge can apply common sense and experience to assess the
possible conclusions of a reasonable juror based on that evidence.
When a judge determines plausibility at the motion to dismiss stage,
common sense replaces evidence and the decision is based solely on
existing judicial knowledge rather than the permissible extrapolation
of what a reasonable juror could infer in light of the developed
evidence.
Before plausibility, there simply was no permissible sans-evidence
basis for a jury, or a judge for that matter, to determine the likelihood
concerning the existence of a plaintiff’s alleged theory of recovery, ex-
cept when judicial notice permitted it or the cause of action involved
little green men.  Lack of discrimination in Iqbal, however, was not
judicially noticeable nor was it dependent on the existence of little
green men.253  Essentially, the application of judicial experience and
common sense at the pleading stage is, in the words of professor
Thomas, a radical “blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases
they disfavor.”254
Requiring a reasonable inference at the pre-discovery, pre-eviden-
tiary pleading stage is radical.  Prior to plausibility pleading, evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of an inference or verdict was the exclusive
province of a summary judgment motion and completely foreign to the
Rule 12(b)(6) context:
The issue in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion is not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether he or she is entitled to offer evi-
dence to support the claims.  In contrast, summary judgment litigants do have
the opportunity to develop some evidence on the issues.  The question at the
summary judgment stage of litigation . . . is whether the nonmovant’s evi-
dence would support a reasonable verdict in the nonmovant’s favor.255
Professor Thomas believes the plausibility pleading standard repre-
sents an inappropriate conflation of the motion to dismiss and the
253. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (“To be clear, we do not reject
[allegations of discrimination] on the ground that they are unrealistic or
nonsensical.”).
254. Thomas, supra note 220, at 32.  Professor Malveaux also describes the distinction
between permissible and impermissible application of judicial experience and
common sense as follows:
[I]t is important to recognize that subjective criteria are not per se im-
permissible or illegitimate.  They are often essential tools for evaluating
applicants and employees, especially for supervisory and leadership po-
sitions.  Courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized that sub-
jectivity can play an important evaluative and screening function,
thereby warranting judicial deference to the employer’s decision-mak-
ing.  It is when such subjectivity is excessive and uncabined that its util-
ity starts to wane and the risk of bias, inter alia, surfaces.
Malveaux, supra note 206, at 98–99 (citations omitted).
255. JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 17.03 (Release 85-4 2008).
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summary judgment motion.  She points out the similarities between
the motions are that (1) plausibility language was commonly used in
summary judgment motions,256 (2) under both motions courts now ap-
pear to be comparing the inferences favoring the nonmoving party
against those favoring the moving party,257 and (3) courts appear to
use their own opinions of what is sufficient to determine
plausibility.258
One stark difference between the motions indicates that plausibil-
ity pleading ironically might require more on the part of the nonmov-
ing party to survive a motion to dismiss than to survive a summary
judgment motion.  At least in summary judgments, all inferences are
interpreted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.259  By
contrast, in the plausibility analysis, I believe the inferences do not
appear to be interpreted in favor of the non-moving party.  For exam-
ple, in Iqbal, the majority identifies the allegations, which include
facts the Court claims are entitled to the presumption of truth under
the plausibility analysis.260  Yet, despite paying lip service to those
facts as presumed true, the mere existence of an alternative explana-
tion rebutted the purported presumption of truth; “Taken as true,
these allegations are consistent with petitioners’ purposefully
designating detainees of high interest because of their race, religion,
or national origin.  But given more likely explanations, they do not
plausibly establish this purpose.”261
Clearly, the allegations were not taken as true if the mere exis-
tence of possible alternative causalities is enough to preempt discov-
ery related to the cause of the allegations.  “As between that ‘obvious
alternative explanation’ for the arrests . . .  and the purposeful, invidi-
ous discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a
plausible conclusion.”262
256. See Thomas, supra note 220, at 29–31.
257. Id. at 30.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110,
1140 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The dissent’s interpretation of the independent examina-
tion rule would require us to abandon a fundamental tenet of summary judgment
procedure, namely, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.”).
260. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009)  (“The complaint alleges that ‘the
[FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of
September 11.’ . . . It further claims that ‘[t]he policy of holding post-September-
11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were
“cleared” by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.’” (emphasis added)).
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 1951–52 (citations omitted).
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No litigant expects a judge to leave common sense and experience
at home when the judge enters the courtroom, but that applicable
common sense is critical when and where it applies within the litiga-
tion stream.  Even if part of the reasonableness in summary judgment
is that a decision is made in the unclear analytical space between
weighing and quantifying,263 it is not as violative of the Seventh
Amendment when compared to plausibility because the judge is using,
at least in part, evidence developed by the parties to inductively rea-
son a result.  The presence of this evidence tempers the unbridled lati-
tude existing at the pleading stage for the application of judicial
experience and common sense when determining whether an infer-
ence is reasonable or plausible.
In contrast, in plausibility, which occurs at the pleading stage,
there is no evidence to consider, and therefore the entire more likely
than not analysis is made without evidence and within the jury’s terri-
tory of weighing evidence.  The judge is a trespasser according to the
constitution and the Rules of Judicial Ethics.264  Plausibility or rela-
tive likelihoods simply should not be determined at the pleading stage
given the direct relationship between knowledge base and accuracy of
inferences or plausibility.265
C. Neuroscience and the Myth of Empathetic Judging
1. Human Nature as a Barrier to Empathetic Judging
Scholars such as professor Darrell Miller approvingly describe the
plausibility calculus as an avenue to achieve eventual, empathy-based
judicial decision making.266  For example, professor Miller states that
“[b]y making conscious effort to imagine themselves in the position of
another, judges can arrive at better estimations of whether a set of
facts, taken as true, present a plausible claim.”267  Professor Miller is
likely overstating the role of the cognitive process in modulating em-
pathic ability.  Human nature and judicial nurture are significant bar-
riers to empathetic ability.
263. See supra subsection III.B.2.b (explaining the myth of judicial dichotomy in sum-
mary judgment).
264. See Sidhu, supra note 43, at 426–27; see also Miller, supra note 149, at 1005–06
(explaining the “probability” requirement at the pleading stage would be a
change in the division of judge and jury).
265. See supra note 163 (describing the direct relationship between accurately deter-
mining probabilities or plausibility and the quantity of knowledge the modeler
possesses in Bayesian probability).
266. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 149 (arguing plausibility may be a way to encourage
empathy based judicial decision making).
267. Id. at 1009.
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A recent study in the Journal of Neuroscience indicates empathy is
evolutionarily and biologically biased, based on race at an affective
rather than cognitive level.268  The study found:
Racial group membership defines coalitions and alliances during evolution
and thus results in strong modulation of the neural substrates of emotional
components of empathy . . . . It appears that, relative to cultural influence on
empathy, if any, the modulation of empathy by racial group membership is
more fundamental and plays a more pivotal role in shaping social
behaviors.269
Even studies, which suggest a cognitive rather than affective basis for
the direct relationship between our ability to empathize and the phe-
notypic similarity of the person we are empathizing with,
acknowledge:
As a social species, humans have evolved for cooperative living in social
groups and possess potent psychological and neural mechanisms that foster
adaptive sociality. . . . Effective cooperative living sometimes entails belonging
to smaller social groups and limiting resource sharing to members of that
group so that individual costs and risks associated with nonreciprocated altru-
ism are reduced.270
Biologically, our ability to empathize differs with the similarity in
race and ethnicity of the individual with whom we are empathizing.271
This reality reveals “social sensitivity in the human sensorimotor sys-
tem and”272 the existence of social categorization at “basic sen-
sorimotor levels of brain processing.”273
Professor Malveaux is in accord in recognizing the dangers of
equating plausibility with empathy-based judicial decision making.274
268. Xiaojing Xu et al., Do You Feel My Pain?  Racial Group Membership Modulates
Empathic Neural Responses, J. NEUROSCIENCE, July 1, 2009, at 8525.
269. Id. at 8528.
270. Vani A. Mathur et al., Neural Basis of Extraordinary Empathy and Altruistic
Motivation, 51 NEUROIMAGE 1468, 1474 (2010).
271. Alessio Avenant et al., Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Reasonance
with Other-Race Pain, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1020 (2010).
272. Id. at 1018, 1020.
273. Id.
274. See Malveaux, supra note 206, at 96–98.  Malveaux explains this danger, stating:
According to legal realists, despite their best efforts, judges’ back-
grounds and attitudes already play a significant role in case outcomes.
In assessing the sufficiency of the “judicial experience and common
sense” standard for determining plausibility, empirical studies on the
impact of excessive subjectivity and intuition on decision-making are in-
structive.  Such studies suggest that, where possible, it is important for a
standard not to be overly subjective or reliant on intuition.
Sociological and psychological literature explains how excessive sub-
jectivity increases the risk of biased decision-making in the workplace.
For example, in the employment context, employers who rely on exces-
sively subjective criteria in hiring, promotions, and other employment
actions run the risk of violating the federal civil rights laws because of
the propensity of bias to surface.  Federal courts have long recognized
this risk.  The Supreme Court itself, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, did the same, noting that “an employer’s undisciplined system of
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She cites a study examining judicial reasoning and decision making by
252 trial judges, which concluded:
[I]ntuition is also the likely pathway by which undesirable influences, like the
race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system.  Today, the
overwhelming majority of judges in America explicitly reject the idea that
these factors should influence litigants’ treatment in court, but even the most
egalitarian among us may harbor invidious mental associa-
tions. . . . [I]ntuitive judgment is more likely to occur than active deliberation
where trial judges labor under heavy docket loads and serious time
pressures.275
Given these bio-genetic barriers to effective, race-neutral empathy,
and the legal scholarship examining them, how could any of the Su-
preme Court justices ever effectively imagine themselves in the posi-
tion of an Arab Muslim after September 11th, or a Japanese American
during the era of Korematsu’s legitimacy?276  Even absent the docu-
mented involvement of racial bias in empathy, plausibility and the in-
creased emphasis on judicial experience and common sense is an
undemocratic derogation of the jury’s role in the civil justice
system.277
2. Judicial Nurture as a Barrier to Empathetic Judging
Any remaining debate that nurture can trump nature, thus remov-
ing the bio-genetic and evolutionary barriers to empathetic judging
described above, may be dispelled by comparing the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Yun v. Ford.278  This negligence case highlights
the significant barrier that nurture alone presents to utopian, em-
pathetic judging.  In Yun, the majority decided proximate cause could
not exist as a matter of law, and it removed the issue from the jury’s
consideration.279  The majority concluded—based on its common-
sense knowledge—it was unforeseeable as a matter of law that on a
rainy night in New Jersey a passenger in a car would take the risk of
exiting a vehicle on a major thoroughfare to recover a spare tire as-
sembly that had fallen off the car.280
subjective decision making” does not guarantee “that the particular su-
pervisors to whom this discretion is delegated always act without dis-
criminatory intent.”
Id. (citations omitted).
275. Id. at 99–100 (citing Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How the Judges
Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31–35 (2007)).
276. See generally Sidhu, supra note 43 (equating Iqbal with Korematsu in terms of
the unique national security climates in both cases).
277. See Miller, supra note 147, at 34.
278. 647 A.2d 841 (N.J. 1994).
279. Id. at 846.
280. Id. (“Logic and fairness dictate that liability should not extend to injuries re-
ceived as a result of Chang’s senseless decision to cross the Parkway under such
dangerous conditions. Common sense should have persuaded Chang, who was
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The dissenting judge perfectly captured the dangers of unbridled
application of judicial experience and common sense, stating:
We judges are strange creatures.  It is not that we are less brave than others,
but rather by reason of our training, if not our nature, we tend to the con-
servative.  For most of us, prudence and caution are the watchwords.  We are
rarely rewarded for taking risks.  But the rest of the population does not al-
ways act the way we do.  What may appear strange to judges might seem
rather ordinary to others.  It thus generally makes sense to have lay people,
not judges, make decisions on the question of proximate cause, grounded as
that concept is in considerations of foreseeability and fairness.281
Another excellent example of judicial disconnect as a barrier to em-
pathy is found in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service.282  In Navajo,
six Indian tribes283 brought suit against the U.S. Forest Service seek-
ing “to prohibit the federal government from allowing the use of artifi-
cial snow [made from] recycled wastewater, which contain[ed]
0.0001% human waste.”284  The artificial snow was to be used on a ski
area known as the Snowbowl, comprising one geographic percent of
the San Francisco Peaks—which the tribes considered sacred moun-
tain land.285
The tribes sought the injunction under the federal Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, which required a showing of a “ ‘substantial bur-
den’ on the exercise of their religion.”286  They argued that even
though the Snowbowl area comprised only one percent of the San
Francisco Peaks geographically, the use of the recycled wastewater in
that area would “spiritually contaminate the entire mountain and de-
value their religious exercises.”287  In other words, the use of the arti-
ficial snow “desecrate[d] the entire mountain, deprecate[d] their
religious ceremonies, and injure[d] their religious sensibilities.”288
The majority denied the injunction, concluding that waste-contain-
ing snow in a cosmopolitan nation such as the United States would
only have a subjective spiritual effect on the tribes’ religious experi-
ence, and therefore it was not a substantial burden.289  Again, how-
ever, the dissent perfectly captures the inability of the majority to
empathize, stating:
only a passenger, to wait for assistance or abandon the bald tire and damaged
assembly.  The van could have been driven safely home.” (emphasis added)).
281. Id. at 851 (Baime, J., concurring and dissenting).
282. 535 F.3d 1058 (Ariz. 2008).
283. The Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, the Havasupai Tribe, the Hualapai Tribe, the
Yavapai-Apache Nation, and the White Mountain Apache Nation. Id. at 1063
n.2.
284. Id. at 1062.
285. Id. at 1063.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1063–64.
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Perhaps the strength of the Indians’ argument in this case could be seen more
easily by the majority if another religion were at issue.  For example, I do not
think that the majority would accept that the burden on a Christian’s exercise
of religion would be insubstantial if the government permitted only treated
sewage effluent for use as baptismal water, based on an argument that no
physical harm would result and any adverse effect would merely be on the
Christian’s “subjective spiritual experience.”  Nor do I think the majority
would accept such an argument for an orthodox Jew if the government permit-
ted only non-Kosher food.290
Maybe in a cosmopolitan society the judicial majority and its views
are the equivalent of the majority in the sense that the term is used to
describe American society on a broader level.  As a result, and as pro-
fessor Ronner reminds us in Fleeing While Black; The Fourth Amend-
ment Apartheid, the need for judicial restraint is highest in cases like
Iqbal, where there is detention of minority defendants.291  Professor
Ronner analyzes the decisions in Terry v. Ohio and Illinois v. Ward-
low, and argues convincingly that “[t]he law not only allows police har-
assment of minorities, but also seems to encourage it.”292
Yet, despite the recognized and necessary limits on trial judges’
abilities to democratically resolve cases even with evidence, plausibil-
ity analysis has now transformed the pre-evidentiary 12(b)(6) motion
into a draconian “Catch-22”293 for deciding whether or not the plain-
tiff will ultimately prevail.  According to both Twombly and Iqbal, the
facts needed for a plausible complaint are traditionally the type of
facts unearthed in discovery.294  If, without these facts, a plaintiff can-
not satisfy the plausibility standard and is not allowed to engage in
discovery without a plausible complaint, then a finding of implausibil-
ity is certain, and leave to amend is an exercise in futility given the
foreclosure of discovery.295
290. Id. at 1097.
291. See generally Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment
Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383 (2001).
292. Id. at 393 (examining Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119 (2000)).
293. See Ranesh N. Kilaru, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal and the Paradox of
Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 911 (2009) (explaining that the facts needed to
make pleadings plausible are typically facts only obtained in discovery and as
such not yet available at pleading stage).
294. Id.
295. But see Hartnett, supra note 249, at 503–15.  Professor Hartnett argues Iqbal and
Twombly do not foreclose cabined discovery in the pursuit of proving plausibility.
See id. at 503–515.  But I can find no support for this assertion in a fair reading of
the cases, and his view has also been criticized.  Professor Bone, for example,
argues that if pleading-stage discovery is allowed, the rules should expressly al-
low it, and that fitting pleading-stage discovery within the framework of the
Rules is at best an awkward fit. See Malveaux, supra note 206, at 123 n.342.
Examining the normative bases for the courts in Twombly and Iqbal also demon-
strates the unfeasibility of targeted or cabined discovery.  The courts currently
lament the lack of effective case management during discovery. See Ashcroft v.
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So, stripped of the possibility that plausibility is part of the route
to eventual, utopian, and empathy-based judicial decision-making,
what exactly is different about the plausibility standard from an em-
pirically baseless docket-clearing mechanism?
D. The Impossibility of Plausibility’s First Prong
1. Separating Law from Fact is Impossible
The first prong of the plausibility analysis requires the federal
judge to parse the pleading into facts and law.296  The judge is re-
quired to disregard all legal conclusions in the complaint and then
consider whether the pleaded facts suggest plausible entitlement to
relief.297  The Supreme Court in Iqbal did not articulate a mechanism
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (foreclosing discovery absent a plausible com-
plaint, and stating “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.  Sec-
ond, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss”); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–60 (2007) (“Thus,
it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance
of discovery . . . but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery
can be expensive. . . . [A] district court must retain the power to insist upon some
specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy
to proceed.”).  The Twombly Court dedicated a significant portion of its opinion to
addressing the argument, stating:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to
relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process
through “careful case management,” given the common lament that the
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on
the modest side.  And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery
abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage,” much less “lucid instructions to juries,” the threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even ane-
mic cases before reaching those proceedings.  Probably, then, it is only by
taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting con-
spiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of
discovery in cases with no “reasonably founded hope that the [discovery]
process will reveal relevant evidence” to support a . . . claim.
Id. (citations omitted).  If case management in current discovery is too burden-
some, why would courts support adding another layer to the case management;
deciding what the applicable limits on discovery are.  The discovery rules do not
permit definition of the scope of discovery either.  They are written to invoke min-
imal court involvement and severe sanctions are permissible only when a party
requests.  Discovery was designed to involve minimal court involvement. See
Rory Bahadur, Electronic Discovery, Informational Privacy, Facebook and Uto-
pian Civil Justice, 79 MISS. L.J. 317, 362–63 (2009) (explaining the extrajudicial
nature of most discovery proceedings).
296. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
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for distinguishing law from fact298 because this process is
impossible.299
Wright and Miller refer to the attempt to distinguish fact from law
as creating “ ‘evanescent judicial distinctions’ and ‘ultimate calcifica-
tion,’ as well as ‘traps for the unwary’ and ‘tactical advantages’ unre-
lated to the merits . . . .”300  Professor Bone refers to the “hopeless
distinctions among allegations of ultimate fact, legal conclusions, and
evidentiary facts,” and professor Marcus, in the context of pleading,
mentions the “unresolvable disputes about whether certain assertions
were allegations of ultimate fact (proper), mere evidence (improper),
or conclusions (improper).”301  Professor Arthur Miller describes the
factual-legal dichotomy of plausibility as “shadowy at best,” and men-
tions that, like the Emperor in the Emperor’s New Clothes, the differ-
ence between facts and conclusions is likewise without clothes.302
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, legal
scholarship of the era praised the recognition that drawing lines be-
tween law and fact was an impossible task.303  Not only was it impos-
sible but it was a relic of archaic code pleading systems.304  As one
commentator put it: “The Court’s dichotomy between factual allega-
tions and ‘legal conclusions’ is the stuff of a bygone era.  That distinc-
tion was a defining feature of code pleading, but was conspicuously
abolished when the Federal Rules were enacted in 1938.”305  Further,
professor Bone states:
298. Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 859 (2010) (“In Iqbal . . . the Court
deems the key allegations to be legal conclusions not because the plaintiff in-
tended them so—he clearly did not—but because they just were so.  The majority
in Iqbal is extremely unclear as to why these allegations were legal
conclusions.”).
299. Hartnett, supra note 249, at 239 n.68 (describing Professor Bone’s conclusion
that fact and law are indistinguishable).
300. Bone, supra note 298, at 863 n.74.
301. Hartnett, supra note 249, at 486–87 n.69.
302. Miller, supra note 147, at 24.
303. Bone, supra note 298, at 865 n.84 (“The FRCP eliminate any mention of facts
because courts have been trying for five hundred years to find ‘facts’ and nobody
has ever been able to draw a line between what were and what were not ‘facts.’”
(citing Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 12
(1938))).
304. Id. at 859.  Bone explained Iqbal’s adoption of the antiquated approach, stating:
Iqbal’s novel doctrinal contribution is to subdivide the pleading analysis
formally into two prongs, with the first prong sorting legal conclusions
from factual allegations. The distinction between factual allegations and
legal conclusions was an important feature of nineteenth century code
pleading, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated it
and . . . a notice pleading system has little use for it.
Id. (citations omitted).
305. Kilaru, supra note 293, at 914 n.71 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 589–90 (2007)).
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By omitting any reference to “facts” the Federal Rules have avoided one of the
most controversial points in code pleading.  As [p]rofessor Moore has so aptly
stated, “The federal courts are not hampered by the morass of decisions as to
whether a particular allegation is one of fact, evidence, or law.”306
Yet despite the reality that “the Court’s dichotomy between factual
allegations and ‘legal conclusions’ is the stuff of a bygone era . . . which
was conspicuously abolished when the Federal Rules were enacted in
1938,”307 the Supreme Court suddenly—and without explanation—
claims in Iqbal that it can separate law from fact even after the docu-
mented impossibility of the task.
In fact, the current Supreme Court is so confident in its ability that
it is comfortable mandating district court judges to use this distinction
as the basis for determining a plaintiff’s access to federal court.308
The Emperor’s New Clothes indeed.  Especially in light of the follow-
ing, relatively recent statement from the Supreme Court in the case of
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp.:309 “The Court has long noted the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues . . . . ‘Nor do
we yet know of any other rule or principle that will unerringly distin-
guish a factual finding from a legal conclusion.’”310
Despite the established inability to distinguish law from fact, some
scholars have attempted to split hairs in order to make sense of the
plausibility standard.  The motivation for these attempts seems to be
the Twombly majority’s forced reaffirmation of Form 11’s validity.311
Form 11 is the form in the “appendix” referred to in Rule 84, dem-
onstrating what is legally sufficient for a negligence complaint under
the “simplicity and brevity” contemplated by the Federal Rules.
Outside of caption and jurisdictional allegations, Form 11 in its en-
tirety states:
1. On date at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against
the plaintiff.
2. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or income, suf-
fered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of $ _____>.
3. Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for $
<_____>, plus costs.312
Simultaneously, Rule 84 establishes that “[t]he forms in the Ap-
pendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brev-
ity that these rules contemplate.”313  In accordance with Rule 84 and
306. Bone, supra note 298, at 865 n.84.
307. Hartnett, supra note 249, at 486 n.68 (citing Twombly, 440 U.S. at 589–90
(2007)).
308. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (explaining the first prong of the
Iqbal inquiry requires the judge to separate law from fact).
309. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
310. Id. at 401 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982)).
311. See Bone, supra note 298, at 860–61.
312. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (emphasis added).
313. FED. R. CIV. P. 84.
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the limits on the Supreme Court’s ability to alter or amend the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure as per the Rules Enabling Act,314 the
majority in Twombly was forced to reaffirm the continued validity of
Form 11.315  According to Twombly, Form 11 is plausible and with-
stands a 12(b)(6) challenge.316
The question then becomes why negligence in Form 11 is consid-
ered a fact to which the Twombly and Iqbal Courts afford the pre-
sumption of truth in the context of plausibility analysis while
conspiracy and discrimination are simultaneously considered legal
conclusions not entitled to the presumption of truth.317  The afore-
mentioned scholarly, hair-splitting attempts to distinguish Form 11
and negligence, on the one hand, and conspiracy and discrimination
on the other, latch on to the language of Iqbal, which states that
“Twombly called for a ‘flexible “plausibility standard,” which obliges a
pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those con-
texts where such amplification is needed to render the claim
plausible.’ ”318
2. The Fallacy of Context Specific Factual Amplification
Professor Hartnett offers an explanation for this dichotomous
treatment of negligence, on the one hand, and conspiracy and discrim-
ination, on the other.  He suggests that Form 11 represents a situation
where a “ ‘court can easily see’ the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff,”319
while courts need more in the cases of conspiracy and discrimination
in order to make the inference plausible.  He thus distinguishes Iqbal,
Twombly, and their respective allegations of discrimination and con-
spiracy as allegations which are contrary to judicial baseline assump-
tions about the way the world works.320
Implicit in professor Hartnett’s argument and in the reasoning of
the Second Circuit is that there are certain factual contexts in which a
pleading needs factual amplification depending on the substantive
theory of law.  Professor Malveaux also attempts to illustrate this dif-
ference by distinguishing between negligence and civil rights
314. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
explanation in Swierkiewicz of its limited ability to modify the pleading stan-
dards outside of the rule amendment procedure within the Rules Enabling Act).
315. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007) (comparing the
invalid Twombly complaint with the valid complaint under Form [11]).
316. Id.
317. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (explaining the two steps of plausi- R
bility analysis); see also supra note 259 and accompanying text (demonstrating
factual allegations are “tak[en] as true,” in assessing plausibility).
318. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
319. Hartnett, supra note 249, at 493, 496 (“Plausibility is easier to find in claims of
negligence based on a factual sketch of a car accident on a public street.”).
320. Id. at 500.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB201.txt unknown Seq: 51 30-NOV-11 7:07
2011] THE SCIENTIFIC IMPOSSIBILITY OF PLAUSIBILITY 485
claims.321  Form 11 is plausible because, according to her, the mere
fact that defendant hit plaintiff with his car is indicative of illegal be-
havior.322  She also states the mere fact that defendant hit plaintiff
with his car is indicative of negligence because the contact would not
normally occur in the absence of negligence.323  No more is required to
satisfy the plausibility standard than the mere allegation that negli-
gence occurred and the plaintiff was harmed on a specific date at a
specific time.324  She seems to be advocating that the act of hitting the
plaintiff with his car is therefore subject to only one interpretation:
negligence on the defendant’s part.325
By contrast, in civil rights claims such as Iqbal, professor
Malveaux argues the factual allegations—for example dismissal or de-
tention as in Iqbal—“are more likely to be subject to multiple interpre-
tations.”326  More is required to prove plausibility as a result of the
multiple interpretations or explanations for the conduct alleged in a
discrimination suit.327
In addition to professor Steven Burbank, who at the 2009 annual
meeting of the American Association of Law Schools described this
sort of distinction as an attempt to “turn chicken shit into chicken
salad,” I argue the distinction is a gross oversimplification of tort law.
Professor Malveaux’s statement implies that we may invoke some un-
defined, doctrinal relative of res ipsa loquitor every time a plaintiff is
hit by a car, which would allow the inference of negligent conduct
merely because an accident occurred.328  Res ipsa loquitor simply
321. See Malveaux, supra note 206, at 88.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See id.
326. Id. at 87.
327. Id. at 87–88.  Professor Hartnett explains:
For example, an employer who denies a female worker a promotion
might do so because she is a woman (a violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964) or because she is rude (a legitimate employer prerog-
ative).  The factual allegation of the denial is consistent with two pos-
sibilities, neither of which can be confirmed at the pleading stage.  Or
the employer may have denied the employee because she was both a wo-
man and rude, in which case the plaintiff can allege a mixed motive.  Or
the employer may have denied her for a different reason altogether—her
older age—which would constitute a separate claim under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act.  By discounting as implausible factual
allegations because they are equally consistent with legal and illegal be-
havior, the new pleading standard penalizes plaintiffs who seek relief for
invidious discrimination because they do not have “further factual en-
hancement” to cross the line from possible to plausible based on the
judge’s “judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. (citations omitted).
328. See Bolton v. Sea Mar Housing & Logistics Inc., 51 So. 2d 836, 840 (La. App.
2010) (“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself. Res
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means “the thing speaks for itself.”329  It is an extremely rare excep-
tion to the general rule that a negligence plaintiff must prove unrea-
sonable conduct on the part of the defendant.330  When res ipsa is
applicable, the mere occurrence of an accident permits an inference of
negligence even in the absence of direct evidence of negligence, if cer-
tain conditions are met.331
These conditions are that (1) the accident is not normally the type
of accident that would occur in the absence of unreasonable conduct,
and (2) the defendant has exclusive control of the instrumentality
which caused the harm.332  Absent res ipsa, the plaintiff in a negli-
gence case must provide evidence of unreasonable conduct.333  One
practitioner explains why professor Malveaux’s assertion that the
mere occurrence of an auto accident permits a baseline assumption of
negligence is incorrect:
These accidents occur under a large variety of circumstances under which dif-
ferent drivers and even non-drivers may be potentially at-fault for the acci-
dent.  It is the rare case when only one inference may be drawn as to the who
is at-fault for the accident.  Auto accidents and truck accidents are not typical
res ipsa cases.334
Res ipsa is clearly inapplicable to Form 11 as it currently reads
because many other possibilities apart from negligence exist that may
have caused the collision, and none of them receive a reduction in
plausibility simply because the plaintiff alleges negligence.  For exam-
ple, the defendant may have skidded into the plaintiff on ice that no
reasonable person could have foreseen; the defendant’s tire may have
blown out due to an undetectable manufacturing defect; an emergency
may have been occurring which relieved the defendant of the duty to
act as a reasonable person; or the defendant may have suffered an
ipsa is a rule of circumstantial evidence which allows a court to infer negligence
on the part of the defendant if the facts indicate the defendant’s negligence, more
probably than not, caused the injury.”).
329. Id.
330. See Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 128 So. 2d 660, 665 (La. 1961) (“This doc-
trine is a qualification of the general rule that negligence is not to be presumed
but must always be affirmatively proved, and therefore should be sparingly ap-
plied, and only in exceptional cases where the demands of justice make that ap-
plication essential.”).
331. See id.
332. See, e.g., Spott v. Otis Elevator Co., 601 So. 2d 1355, 1362 (La. 992) (stating gen-
erally that res ipsa “obtains when three requirements are met: 1) the circum-
stances surrounding the accident are so unusual that, in the absence of other
pertinent evidence, there is an inference of negligence on the part of the defen-
dant; 2) the defendant had exclusive control over the thing causing the injury;
and 3) the circumstances are such that the only reasonable and fair conclusion is
that the accident was due to a breach of duty on defendant’s part”).
333. See Day, 128 So. 2d at 665.
334. Res Ipsa Loquitur in Maryland, MILLERANDZOIS.COM, http://www.millerandzois.
com/Res-Ipsa-Loquitur-Maryland.html (last visited July 24, 2010).
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unpredictable heart attack or seizure while driving, causing the defen-
dant to lose control of the car.  The list is endless.
Contrary to professor Hartnett’s and professor Malveaux’s asser-
tions, proof of negligence is not easy.  In fact, the concept of negligence
is difficult and the vast amount of scholarship associated with the re-
cent Restatement (Third) of Torts and the formulation of negligence
reaffirms this.335  Scholars are yet to agree on the difference between
unreasonable conduct and proximate cause.336  Moreover, the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts has just altered the elements, pleading, and
proving of negligence.337
Outside of res ipsa, proving unreasonable conduct or negligent be-
havior sometimes involves complex, risk-utility, and cost-benefit anal-
yses as well as complex foreseeability considerations.338  By no stretch
of the imagination is the collision of the defendant’s car with the plain-
tiff indicative of negligence, and the allegations of Form 11 do not per-
mit a reasonable or plausible inference of negligence.339
335. See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, the New Vision of Duty and
Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV.
739 (2005); W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921
(2005); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third)
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001); David
Howarth, Many Duties of Care—or A Duty of Care? Notes from the Underground,
26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (2006); Fleming James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal
Cause, 60 YALE L. J. 761 (1951); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Back-
ground of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127 (1990); Patrick J.
Kelley, Proximate Cause in the History of Negligence Law: History, Theory, and
the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49 (1991); Patrick J. Kelley, Restating
Duty, Breach, and, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and
the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039 (2001); Jordan K. Kolar, Is this Really the
end of Duty?: The Evolution of the Third Restatement of Torts, 87 MINN. L. REV.
233 (2002); Paul F. Marci, How the Law Court uses Duty to Limit the Scope of
Negligence Liability, 53 ME. L. REV. 503 (2001); Nelson P. Miller, An Ancient Law
of Care, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (2004); Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-
Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941 (2001);
Michael A. Stein, Priestley v. Fowler (1837) and the Emerging Tort of Negligence,
44 B.C. L. REV. 689 (2003); Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the
Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That Helps or a Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L.
REV. 77 (1990).
336. See generally Rory Bahadur, Almost a Century and Three Restatements after
Green it is Time to Admit and Remedy the Nonsense of Negligence, 38 N. KU. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author and the Nebraska Law Review).
337. Id.
338. See supra note 335 (demonstrating the vast amount of literature debating the
proof or negligent conduct).
339. On a humorous note, Professor Malveaux’s assertions regarding the simplicity of
negligence and its immediate plausibility reminds me of my service on the faculty
recruitment committee.  Sometimes potential faculty candidates have not listed a
first-year course they would be willing to teach.  The existing faculty then ask if
there are any first-year courses they can teach.  Subsequently, they sometimes
respond in a flippant manner—representing a mixture of disdain for the subject
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Additionally, it is ironic that a negligence complaint survives the
scythe of plausibility dismissal while allegations such as conspiracy
and discrimination do not.  Negligence complaints are subject to dis-
missal at the pleading stage because the existence of a duty is typi-
cally a question for the judge.340  Unlike negligence however, where
the question of duty has been typically one for the judge, issues of
conspiracy and discrimination are highly fact specific and typically
presented to a jury.341
If anything, the issue of “negligent driving” is one a judge should
feel more comfortable resolving at the pleading stage as a matter of
law than allegations involving conspiracy or discrimination.  In con-
trast to negligence, where the judge rightfully determines whether a
duty exists as a matter of law, claims involving intent or state of mind
such as discrimination and conspiracy should typically be reserved for
the jury.342  The irony is that these very claims which should be re-
served for the jury are more difficult to plead in a way that will satisfy
the plausibility standard.343
Nothing about Form 11 and negligence serves to justify footnote
ten of the Twombly opinion,344 or to reconcile Rule 84 and its Rules
Enabling Act authority with plausibility analysis.  Ultimately, be-
cause the first step in the plausibility inquiry requires separation of
matter and the obviation of any persons’ ability to teach such—by saying, “I can
teach torts!”  Enough said.
340. See, e.g., Riedel v. Sheraton Bal Harbor Assoc., 806 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
341. Many courts have held that the determination of discrimination is a question of
fact. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 200 P.3d 898, 900 (Cal. 2009) (racial discrimi-
nation); Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation v. Balaguer, 729 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (employment discrimination); S. Ill. Clinic, Ltd. v. Human
Rights Comm’n, 654 N.E.2d 655, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (age discrimination);
Louisiana v. Edwards, 957 So. 2d 185, 194 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (racial discrimina-
tion); Michigan v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 715, 727 (Mich. 2005) (peremptory chal-
lenges); Burks v. Amite Cnty. Sch. Dist., 708 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (Miss. 1998)
(racial discrimination); Smith v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 351 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Mo.
1961) (revising rate schedules for users of commercial power was not discrimina-
tory); Missouri v. White, 913 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (peremptory
challenges); Del., L. & W. R.R. v. Neeld, 130 A.2d 6, 10 (N.J. 1957) (authority to
assess railroad property taxes); Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, 55 P.3d 1208, 1212 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (age and sex discrimination);
Greyhound Lines-E. v. Geiger, 366 S.E.2d 135, 138 (W.Va. 1988) (employer racial
discrimination).
342. Cf. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 459 (2008).
343. Cf. id. (“[A] complaint with an antitrust claim rooted in conspiracies based on
indirect inferential evidence will require more facts to traverse the threshold of
plausibility than would be needed in a case asserting the conversion of personal
property.”).
344. See infra note 398 and accompanying text.
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law from fact,345 it involves a process which is both empirically neces-
sary to plausibility analysis and simultaneously impossible.
E. The Similarity of Plausibility and Credibility
An established rule of American civil jurisprudence is that the
judge is barred from determining credibility because it encroaches on
the constitutionally protected territory of the jury.346  If plausibility is
akin to a credibility determination, it is constitutionally unaccept-
able.347  The following illustration suggests that plausibility is the
normative equivalent of a credibility analysis.
Consider an eighteen-year old foreign student who is unfamiliar
with the structure of a U.S. law school.  The student has heard from
other people that she should speak with the dean of the law school she
wishes to attend.  The student arrives at a coffee shop in the city
where the law school is located and calls the law school, asking to
meet the dean in the coffee shop.  Twenty minutes later, two individu-
als walk into the coffee shop and approach the student.  Both are well
dressed and both state to the student: “I am the dean.”  The student
asks them both: “How do I know you are the dean?”  They both re-
spond: “I have a desk at the law school in an office labeled ‘Dean’s
Office,’ and I park in a spot in the parking lot of the law school with a
sign stating ‘Parking for Dean Only.’”
One of the persons speaking with the student really believes he is
the dean; the other is lying to the student.  The student, faced with
identifying the real dean, uses her limited knowledge of what honest
people look like and tells the person she thinks is lying to leave the
coffee shop on the basis of this credibility determination.  Analogized
to civil litigation, the student’s decision is the equivalent of a credibil-
ity determination.  Yet, the Supreme Court assures plausibility is not
credibility when it claims it does not engage in probability
determinations.348
However, now consider if the student simply eliminates one of the
alleged deans using a different calculus.  She tells one of them: “It is
possible you are the dean and I do not know nor care whether or not
you believe you are lying.  In fact, I think you honestly believe you are
345. See supra note 95.
346. Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to
Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV 261, 281 n.127 (2009) (explaining that
even the majority of the Supreme Court acknowledges credibility, or weighing the
credibility of a witness, is impermissible).
347. See id.
348. See Miller, supra note 149 (explaining that if plausibility were probability it
would involve impermissible determinations of credibility and violate the Sev-
enth Amendment); see also Sidhu, supra note 43, at 489–90 (warning of the im-
permissibility of judges, rather than juries, determining what is more likely than
not).
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the dean but I do not think you are the dean based on my limited
experience and common sense regarding what deans look and sound
like, and so it is more likely someone else is the dean.”  In other words,
she believes it is possible the person is the dean, but she does not
think it is plausible.  This is exactly what Iqbal mandates a judge to
do when deciding if a claim is plausible.  “Determining whether a com-
plaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the court of appeals
observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”349
The result is the same in both scenarios: the end of the conversa-
tion.  Or by analogy, the end of the civil action.  In one case it is based
on credibility, but in the other it is based on the judge’s belief that
something other than the alleged theory of liability was more likely
responsible for the alleged harm.350  The result of applying both meth-
ods of dismissing the self-proclaimed deans is identical; dismissal
without discovery.  There may be moral ramifications for the attorney
and client concerning credibility-based dismissal not present in a
plausibility-based dismissal.  Apart from this, there appears to be no
tangible difference between the two.  It is an inadequate consolation
prize for the plaintiffs and their attorneys in Twombly and Iqbal that
the Court does not say it does not believe them.  The actions were dis-
missed without discovery exactly as if it was patently clear they were
lying or their complaints had zero probability.
In addition to the negligible difference between plausibility and
credibility, the use of common sense and experience rejects well-estab-
lished 12(b)(6) jurisprudence which, much like the parol evidence rule
in contracts, permits a court to concentrate only on the contents of the
complaint if the Rule 12(d) shunt to summary judgment is inapplica-
ble.351  Whereas the foreign law student is allowed to use common
sense and experience in an unbridled fashion to end her conversations
with the dean, neither federal litigation norms352 nor the role of dis-
covery in the broad structure of adversarial justice353 permit a judge
349. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009); see also supra notes 250–53 and
accompanying text (discussing the use of “common sense” at different stages of
pleading and procedure).
350. Id. at 1951–52 (“As between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for the ar-
rests . . . and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to infer,
discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.”).
351. See Miller, supra note 147, at 28 n.103.
352. See supra subsection III.B.3 (explaining the difference in applying judicial com-
mon sense at the pleading stage and at summary judgment).
353. See Bahadur, supra note 295, at 318–19 (describing the adversarial system as “[a]
system for the consideration and resolution of legal disputes under which each
side is entitled to have its nonfrivolous contentions considered by interests oppos-
ing them and presented in relationship to the opposing contentions, with the as-
sistance of competent counsel, after reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard, to an impartial judge or jury for fair consideration and final decision all in
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the same freedom at the pleading stage when deciding to dismiss a
plaintiff’s lawsuit.
As professor Miller points out, judicial discretion, if unconstrained
at the motion to dismiss stage, would allow a judge to dismiss a com-
plaint preventing adjudication on the merits “whenever an equivocal
set of facts can be interpreted as ‘more likely’ to reflect lawful con-
duct.”354  Professor Miller doesn’t merely believe that the normative
bases of credibility and plausibility are the same.  He believes that
plausibility analysis results in something so similar to credibility or
judicial weighing of evidence that it represents a significant shift in
the functional division of the judge and jury in civil trials.355  I agree.
F. Unacceptable Procedural Rule Conflation
1. Conflation of Rules 11 and 12
Rule 11 requires that every pleading submitted to a court be
signed.356  The signature on a complaint represents a certification
that the advocate has done an investigation reasonable under the cir-
cumstances,357 and that after such an investigation it appears the
“factual allegations of the complaint have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . . .”358
Rule 11 sanctions are no longer dependent on a litigant’s culpable
conduct:359
The test for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions [is] “whether the individual’s
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.”  The standard of “reasona-
ble under the circumstances” is “objective,” and thus, a demonstration of “good
faith” does not defeat a motion for sanctions.  Allegations of sanctionable con-
duct should not be viewed with “the wisdom of hindsight,” but “by inquiring
what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other pa-
per was submitted.”360
a manner provided by law commit[ted] to the immutable American expectation
that liberty will be ordered under law only after impartial judgment upon fair
consideration of conflicting ideas”); id. at 319 (explaining the role of discovery in
the adversarial system as “the principal fact-gathering mechanism in the formal
civil litigation process” is an integral part of the adversarial system of civil justice
and is “one of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure”).  The process is fundamental in federal notice pleading as the basis for
development of a party’s factual contentions. See id.
354. See Miller, supra note 147, at 29.
355. Id. at 30.
356. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
357. Id. 11(b).
358. Id. 11(b)(3).
359. See id. 11(c).
360. Heike v. Guevera, No. 09-10427-BC, 2010 WL 3905088, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
30, 2010) (citations omitted).
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In the American adversarial system, it is the parties and not the
passive judge who are tasked with developing evidence in the case.361
The requirement of a passive judge in the American system reflects
American values such as “human individuality” and the prevention of
“state overreaching and tyranny.”362  It is these values which provide
the impetus for our concept of discovery.363
When one party alleges a complaint violates Rule 11(b) and seeks
post-safe harbor sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c), the judge must de-
termine whether the submitting party performed a reasonable investi-
gation at the time of the complaint’s submission and whether the
results of that investigation objectively demonstrated the existence of
evidentiary support for the factual contentions in the pleading.364  In
many instances, before the judge can rule on the propriety of sanc-
tions, discovery is necessary to determine whether, after reasonable
investigation, there was the likelihood of evidentiary support for an
allegation.365  The advisory committee notes go on to explain: “[I]f a
party has evidence with respect to a contention that would suffice to
defeat a motion for summary judgment based thereon, it would have
sufficient “evidentiary support” for the purposes of Rule 11.”366
If implausibility equates to a finding by a judge that no evidence
developed in favor of the plaintiff’s theory of liability can emerge, then
clearly an advocate charged with developing the case must have
breached his or her duty to conduct an investigation reasonable under
the circumstances.  An adversarial advocate charged with zealous and
361. See Bahadur, supra note 295, at 353–54.  There, I describe the difference in the
American and Continental justice systems:
The major differences between the inquisitorial continental legal system,
typified for example by Germany and France, and the American adver-
sarial legal system may be summarized as follows. The American system
is “characterized by a high degree of partisan behavior, party autonomy,
judicial passivity and reliance on lawyers’ integrity.” In stark contrast to
the American adversarial system where truth is often subordinate to pri-
vacy, is the Continental or inquisitorial system, where resolution of dis-
putes is not party driven before a neutral and passive judge but involves
an inquiry conducted by the court which is not confined to submissions of
the opponents.
Id.
362. See id. at 355.
363. See id. (illustrating a foreign view of the perceived importance of discovery to the
American civil system and as reflecting “American distrust in concentrated power
and the belief that a neutral judge would not apply the same zeal to discovery in
“ferreting” out the positives of their cases and the negatives of their opponent’s”).
364. See Heike, 2010 WL 3905088, at *2–3.
365. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes on 1993 amendments (“The certifi-
cation with respect to allegations and other factual contentions is revised in rec-
ognition that sometimes a litigant may have good reason to believe a fact is true
or false but may need discovery, formal or informal, from opposing parties or
third persons to gather and confirm the evidentiary basis for the allegation.”).
366. Id.
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reasonable investigation should reach the same conclusion that is ob-
vious to the impartial, neutral, non-investigatory referee who is con-
cluding based only on the statements in the pleadings.367  In other
words, if the detached, passive judge in the adversarial system con-
cluded implausibility from mere pleading review, then in the course of
the mandatory reasonable investigation a reasonable attorney would
have also concluded that a cause other than the one alleged in the
complaint was responsible for the plaintiff’s harm.368
However, as previously suggested, implausibility does not equate
to a finding by the judge that no evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
allegations exists.  It means only that the judge as a superficial, non-
investigatory, participant in a trial is able to conclude at the pleading
stage that there is a more likely reason for the alleged harm than the
theory of alleged recovery in the complaint.369  In fact, the Chief
Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also understands Iqbal
as requiring the more likely than not calculus in the plausibility deci-
sion.  “Indeed, as Iqbal teaches, it is only where there are “more likely
explanations” for the result that the plausibility of the claim is justifi-
ably suspect.”370
A finding of no plausibility therefore means, even when prohibited
from investigating a case, a judge at the pre-evidentiary pleading
stage is certain enough there is a more likely explanation for the harm
caused than the theory alleged by the plaintiff, warranting termina-
tion of the plaintiff’s cause of action.  Therefore, it appears possible a
judge would dismiss a complaint as implausible even if the judge
thought evidence in support of plaintiff’s theory of liability existed,
thereby making the pleading nonviolative of Rule 11.371
Professor Hartnett also suggests that the plausibility standard is
different from the Rule 11 standard.372  Professor Hartnett attempts
to describe the difference as follows: Rule 11 deals with the “plausibil-
ity of finding evidence to support x given a, b, c and d,” while the mo-
tion to dismiss standard deals with the plausibility of “inferring x
367. See supra notes 361–63 and accompanying text (comparing the passive role of the
judge from the aggressive investigatory and advocacy role of the lawyer in the
American adversarial system).
368. See supra notes 361–63 and accompanying text.
369. See supra subsection III.B.1 (explaining the plausibility analysis as a compara-
tive probability test).
370. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumer Affairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 262 (4th Cir. 2009)
(Jones, J., dissenting).
371. See FED. R. CIV .P. 11 advisory committee’s notes on 1993 amendments (indicat-
ing less evidence is required to avoid sanctions than is required to prevail in sum-
mary judgment motion); see also supra subsection III.B.3 (indicating the
similarity of plausibility to the second prong of summary judgment—judgment as
a matter of law).
372. See Hartnett, supra note 249, at 506–07.
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given a, b, c, and d.”373  He is wrong for one obvious reason and an-
other not so obvious reason.
The obvious reason is that the language of Twombly itself fore-
closes the distinction attempted by professor Hartnett. Twombly ex-
plains: “Asking for plausible grounds . . . simply calls for enough
fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evi-
dence of illegal agreement.”374  The Twombly opinion explains plausi-
bility in the context of the motion to dismiss as exactly what professor
Hartnett describes plausibility should mean in Rule 11.375  Both con-
cern the plausibility of developing evidence to support the allegations
of the complaint.
The less obvious reason requires a parsing of professor Hartnett’s
illustrative differences.  Professor Hartnett fails to identify what ex-
actly a, b, c, and d represent in his illustration.  If a, b, c, and d are
merely statements in a complaint and not evidence, then it is only in
those situations where plaintiffs plead themselves out of court that
plausibility can be applied as described by professor Hartnett.  But in
these situations implausibility would be identical to the Rule 11 stan-
dard.  If a, b, c, and d are not evidence, plausibility analysis, which
professor Hartnett describes as the plausibility of “inferring x given a,
b, c, and d,”376 can be illustrated by an almost satirical modification of
Form 11.  To reiterate: “On date at place the defendant negligently
drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.  As a result, the plaintiff
was physically injured, lost wages or income, suffered physical and
mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of $ <_____.”377
According to the Twombly opinion, and in accord with the contin-
ued viability of Rule 84, this complaint survives the plausibility in-
quiry.378  However, consider a modified version of Form 11 in which
the plaintiff repeats the allegations above but additionally states that
the reason plaintiff alleges defendant was driving negligently was be-
cause “Defendant was driving with due care, paying attention and
looking straight ahead at the time of the collision.”  At some point, the
plaintiff deposits enough facts that a judge can conclude the prob-
ability of negligence approaches zero—or impossibility—in light of the
additional but unnecessary facts pled in the complaint.  Thus, it can
be stated that the plaintiff pled himself or herself out of court.
In such a case, if driving with due care, paying attention, and look-
ing straight ahead were considered the equivalent of a, b, c, and d,
then not only is it implausible that the plaintiff was negligent but it is
373. Id.
374. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2009).
375. Compare id. at 556–57, with Hartnett, supra note 249, at 556–67.
376. Hartnett, supra note 249, at 506.
377. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
378. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10
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likely impossible.  In fact, it is fair to say it is very likely some other
cause was the cause of the accident and a plausibility dismissal would
be almost unassailable.379  Likewise, given such allegations, a reason-
able investigation should also have revealed the legal theory of negli-
gence was not “warranted by existing law,” and therefore violative of
Rule 11.380
It is remotely possible to confine Twombly to a situation in which a
plaintiff pled himself out of court.  By alleging there was parallel con-
duct, the Supreme Court’s rationale can plausibly be understood as a
decision that applies when a plaintiff bases recovery on a legal theory
which the allegations of the complaint themselves refute and the case
is implausible because the allegations themselves are inconsistent
with the theory of recovery asserted.381  However, this interpretation
of Twombly as a plaintiff pleading himself or herself out of court is
troubling because, unlike the modified Form 11 example in which
driving with due care and paying attention are inconsistent with neg-
ligence, parallel conduct is not inconsistent with conspiracy.  In fact it
may be indicative of conspiracy.
Conversely, if professor Hartnett’s a, b, c, and d are meant to be
the equivalent of evidence, then professor Thomas is correct when she
argues the motions for summary judgment and 12(b)(6) are now trend-
ing towards being the same thing.382  If a, b, c, and d are evidence,
and if a court will actually consider this evidence when deciding a mo-
tion to dismiss, the court would be making an unprecedented decision
in federal procedure—unless, of course, the motion was converted to a
summary judgment motion under Rule 12(d).383  If a, b, c, and d are
evidence, the line between motions to dismiss and summary judgment
is severely blurred.
The key distinction between implausibility and a Rule 11 violation
appears to be, as the advisory committee notes to Rule 11 explain: a
Rule 11 certification does not mean that the party will prevail with
respect to the contention regarding the fact.  “That summary judg-
ment is rendered against a party does not necessarily mean, for the
purposes of this certification, that it had no evidentiary support for its
proposition.”384  In other words, a judge can conclude another theory
of liability is more likely without believing that the plaintiff has no
evidence in support of the alternative theory of recovery it advanced in
379. Professor Hartnett uses a similar illustration involving an Apple iPod in his arti-
cle. See Hartnett, supra note 249, at 495.
380. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
381. See supra subsection III.A.1 (explaining the possibility of marginalizing the im-
port of the changes wrought by Twombly).
382. See Thomas, supra note 220 (explaining that plausibility analysis is indistin-
guishable from analysis typical of the summary judgment motion).
383. See Miller, supra note 147, at 28 n.103.
384. FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 11 advisory committee’s notes on 1993 amendments.
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the pleadings.  The judge can then conclude on the comparative likeli-
hood that no reasonable juror would rule for the plaintiff.  However, as
mentioned, prior to plausibility analysis, outside of Rule 12(d)’s appli-
cability, this calculus is not the province of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
but is typical of post-discovery summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law decisions, where evidence has already been
presented.385
If a, b, c, and d are evidence in professor Hartnett’s analogy, then
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions are indeed indistinguishable, and
plausibility represents the equivalent of a more likely than not stan-
dard.386  If this is the case, then the following would be true assuming
an honest advocate:
1. If something is plausible it definitely does not violate Rule 11.
2. A pleading could be implausible and also violate Rule 11.
3. A pleading could be implausible but still satisfy Rule 11.
The first statement is correct because if a judge reading the plead-
ings as a disinterested observer is able to conclude that the plaintiff’s
theory of recovery is more likely than not, then clearly the judge is
concluding the reasonable likelihood of evidence exists.  The second
statement is also true because a judge could agree a plaintiff’s theory
of recovery is so remote that he or she could dismiss the complaint and
meet out Rule 11 sanctions after dismissal, when it is revealed the
plaintiff had no reasonable likelihood of producing evidence support-
ing the theory.  The third statement represents situations like Iqbal
and Twombly, where a judge disagrees that the plaintiff’s theory is
plausible or more likely than not, but thinks it is possible that a rea-
sonable plaintiff’s advocate might believe—after a pre-filing investiga-
tion—that evidence of the alleged theory existed.  But this leads us
back to the essential dilemma of plausibility.  Is it appropriate for a
judge to so conclude at the pleading stage without violating the Con-
stitution?387  If no, then Rule 11 and plausibility can only be distin-
guished in the constitutionally barred reality of judges doing more
likely than not analyses at the pleading stage.
2. Conflation of Rules 8 and 9(b)
In deciding whether the employment discrimination complaint at
issue in Swierkiewicz satisfied the specificity required by Rule 8(a)(2),
the Court contrasted the heightened pleading standards of Rule
385. See supra subsection III.B.3 (describing the difference in weighing evidence post-
discovery with attempting the same pre-discovery at the pleading stage).
386. See supra subsection III.B.2 (explaining that at least for one hypothetical reason-
able juror, plausibility is the same as more likely than not).
387. See supra subsection III.B.3 (discussing the impropriety of making more likely
than not decisions at the pleading stage).
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9(b).388  Overwhelming cognitive dissonance is the result of comparing
the language of the unanimous Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz with
the language of Twombly and Iqbal.  This is because the plausibility
standard obliterates any distinction between the general pleading
standard of Rule 8(a) and the heightened pleading standard of Rule
9(b), despite the Supreme Court’s assertion it is incapable of achieving
this conflation by judicial interpretation.389
For example, functionally Rule 8(a) and 9(b) are the same post-
plausibility.  Federal Rule 9(b) has two main functions.  First, it plays
a “screening function, standing as a gatekeeper to discovery, a tool to
weed out meritless fraud claims sooner than later.”390  Second, it pre-
vents defendants from the in terrorem aspects and consequential, in-
equitable settlement pressure of fraud allegations.391  The stated
functions of plausibility are remarkably similar.
In Twombly, the Court announced that the normative efficacy of
discovery as a screening tool was much less than widely acknowl-
edged.392  The Twombly court also proves the plausibility standard
performs a “gatekeeper to discovery” role as well.393  “[I]t is one thing
to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of
discovery . . . but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust
388. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
390. Aubrey v. Barlin, No. A-10-CA-076-22, 2010 WL 3909332, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept.
29, 2010).
391. See Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2nd Cir. 1978).  Commenting on Rule
9(b)’s purpose, the appellate court stated:
The Supreme Court has admonished that to the extent that such discov-
ery “permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up
the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasona-
bly founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a
social cost rather than a benefit.”
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 741 (1975)).
392. Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2009).  The Twombly court stated:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to
relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process
through “careful case management,” given the common lament that the
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on
the modest side.  And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery
abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage,” much less “lucid instructions to juries,” . . . the threat
of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.  Probably, then, it is
only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting
conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense
of discovery in cases with no “reasonably founded hope that the [discov-
ery] process will reveal relevant evidence” to support a [section] 1 claim.
Id. (citations omitted).
393. See id. at 558–59.
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discovery can be expensive.”394  In fact, the screening requirements
for claims of fraud long recognized as a function of Rule 9(b) are now
performed in non-fraud causes of action by the plausibility analysis of
Rule 8(a).395
The discovery gatekeeper role of the plausibility analysis is not
confined to antitrust lawsuits but to law suits in general, as Iqbal em-
phasized: “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.”396
Second, like Rule 9, the role of the plausibility standard is to pre-
vent defendants from succumbing to the settlement pressure, the gen-
esis of which is the lawsuit itself, or to serve the practical purpose of
preventing a plaintiff with “a largely groundless claim” from “tak[ing]
up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so repre-
senting an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.”397
The similarity of the Rule 9(b) standard and the plausibility stan-
dard is also evidenced by comparing footnote ten in the Twombly opin-
ion with the well-established, classic case law on the standard
required by Rule 9(b).  In footnote ten, the majority makes clear that
the Twombly complaint was deficient under a plausibility analysis not
only because it appeared to allege parallel conduct as the only basis of
conspiracy or agreement, but also because it failed to provide impor-
tant information such as “specific time, place, or person involved in
the alleged conspiracies.”398
The contents required of a pleading to satisfy Rule 9(b) are remark-
ably similar.  As in plausibility, a pleading is deficient under Rule 9(b)
when it fails to provide sufficient allegations regarding, “who, what,
when, where and how.”399  In fact, so similar are the standards for
394. Id. at 558.
395. United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“The new [plausibility standard] raises a hurdle in front of what courts had pre-
viously seen as a plaintiff’s nigh immediate access to discovery—modest in its
demands but wide in its scope. . . .  In cases of fraud, Rule 9(b) long played that
screening function, standing as a gatekeeper to discovery, a tool to weed out mer-
itless fraud claims sooner than later.”).
396. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
397. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
398. Id. at 556 n.10.
399. See, e.g., Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.
2010); United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. 614 F.3d 1163,
1171 (10th Cir. 2010); Shandong Yinguang Chem. Indus. Joint Stock Co., Ltd. v.
Potter, 607 F.3d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Lacy v. New
Horizons, Inc., 348 Fed. Appx. 421, 424 (10th Cir. 2009); Exergen Corp. V. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Elms
v. Accenture LLP, 341 Fed. Appx. 869, 873 (4th Cir. 2009); Kearns v. Ford Motor
Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009); Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d
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satisfying the specificity requirements of Rule 9(b) and the plausibility
analysis, federal courts are concluding that complaints satisfy Rule
9(b) when they satisfy the plausibility standard of Twombly.400
One aspect of Rule 9(b) jurisprudence might initially appear to dis-
tinguish its standard from the plausibility standard.  The language of
the plausibility requirement is that the pleading must permit a “rea-
sonable inference” of the theory alleged in the complaint while a Rule
9(b) compliant pleading must permit a “strong inference of fraudulent
conduct.”401  However, the distinction is a linguistic illusion.  The rea-
sonable inference language of the plausibility standard is the
equivalent of a more likely than not standard.402  Nothing in the Rule
(9)(b) jurisprudence indicates that “strong” is necessarily stronger
than reasonable or “more likely than not.”  It is implausible to con-
clude the “strong inference” required by Rule 9(b) is any stronger than
the ultimate burden of proof standard in civil trials, because again
this would mean plaintiffs need to satisfy a stronger burden at the
pleading stage than their ultimate burden at the trial stage.  This, ac-
cording to Swierkiewicz, is incongruous.403  Quite likely, something
less than more likely than not satisfies the heightened pleading re-
quirements of Rule 9(b).
Since plausibility might in fact be the equivalent of more likely
than not and Rule 9(b) logically requires less than a more likely than
not showing at the pleading stage, ironically there is room to argue
that the reasonable inference standard of plausibility is stronger than
the strong inference of Rule 9(b) and therefore more is now required to
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) than Rule 9(b).  Federal judges need not contem-
plate this inversion of Rule 8(a)’s pleading standard with Rule 9(b)’s
because enough mess exists when the standards are merely indistin-
242, 253 (3rd Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Cont’l Common, Inc.,
553 F.3d 869, 874 (5th Cir. 2008).
400. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–56 (stating generally that complaint must
provide enough information to describe a fraudulent scheme to support a plausi-
ble inference that false claims were submitted because plaintiffs provided suffi-
cient factual detail to demonstrate the viablity of their FCA claims and the
dismissal under Rule 9(b) was error); Envirocare of Utah, 614 F.3d at 1173 (con-
flating the standards of Rule 9(b) and plausibility and stating “[r]ather, to avoid
dismissal under Rules 9(b) and 8(a), plaintiffs need only show that, taken as a
whole, a complaint entitles them to relief” (emphasis added)).
401. Compare Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable infer-
ence that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”), with Exergen
Corp., 575 F.3d at 1327 (reiterating Rule 9(b) is satisfied only where the factual
content of the complaint permits a strong inference of fraud).
402. See supra subsection III.B.2.b.
403. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 506 (2002) (explaining brilliantly
that it is “incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dis-
miss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the
merits . . .”).
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guishable.  On the one hand, the Supreme Court has unequivocally
stated the pleading standards can only be elevated by the rule-making
process or by Congressional enactment,404 yet the reasonable infer-
ence requirement of plausibility is a judicial raising of the pleading
standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Iqbal decision left the Supreme Court with two choices to
reach a decision.  One was substantive and the other was procedural.
The substantive option was politically unpalatable and involved recog-
nition—as in Korematsu—that the government is given exponentially
more latitude, in the interest of exceptional threats to national secur-
ity, than is otherwise constitutionally permissible to single out and
detain members of the ethnic group representing the threat.
Acknowledging this would mean the Korematsu decision, widely
reviled as one of the Court’s biggest lapses in judgment, would again
be adorned with the raiment of legal correctness and validity.  Think
of the ramifications if the highest court suspended the treasured ten-
ets of American society.  The phrase “Liberty and Justice for All”405
would be replaced with the phrase Liberty and Justice for All except
where Justice (however you define this illusory concept) and Security
Trump Liberty.  Suffice to say it would wreak havoc with the basic
fabric of American society and the assumptions, necessary both do-
mestically and abroad, which justify America’s place of reverence in
the world.
Instead of answering the substantive question, the Court used a
procedural shortcut.  If my science background made me uncomforta-
ble with the impossibility of plausibility, then my involuntary educa-
tion in a nonsecular elementary school provides me with a metaphor
for plausibility.  Plausibility is a procedural Tower of Babel.  The bibli-
cal Tower of Babel is arguably now a secular metaphor illustrating the
unsustainability of systems comprised of incompatible components.
The wailing cacophony of ignored empirical realities’ renders the plau-
sibility standard unsustainable.
Rule 84’s continued viability, as exemplified by Form 11, conflicts
with the requirements of plausibility pleading.  The constitutional
safeguards preventing the Supreme Court from changing pleading
standards by interpretation scream in frustrated agony when the
pleadings of Swierkiewicz are compared to the rationale of the Iqbal
decision, and when the two are asked to coexist.  The promise of em-
404. See id. at 514–15 (2002).
405. See Ward Connerly, With Liberty and Justice for All, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(April 30, 1996), http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/with-liberty-and-just
ice-for-all.
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pathic judging is too risky in light of the research showing deep ra-
cially based, biogenetic bases for bias and the recognized judicial
disconnect from the populace.
Comparing possibilities without engaging in probability analysis is
impossible, as is the first prong of the Iqbal test: separating law from
fact.  Rule 9(b) loudly reminds us in vain, in light of the plausibility
requirement of Iqbal, about the tenet of statutory interpretation
which requires us to interpret statutes such that no language is re-
dundant.  Rule 11 argues it is distinct from Rule 12 but recognizes
after the plausibility standard that it can only be different in a consti-
tutionally prohibited existence, one in which a judge is allowed to
weigh evidence and engage in dispositive, more likely than not analy-
sis at the pleading stage.
Perhaps the apparent doctrinal dissonance of the Iqbal and Kore-
matsu decisions should not be surprising.  It may be a frightening re-
ality that the founding fathers envisioned the federal courts as
incompetent institutions regarding national security matters, particu-
larly those related to war.  As one conservative viewpoint states:
The courts are institutionally incompetent when it comes to matters of na-
tional security, particularly the prosecution of war.  The Framers intended it
that way.  National-security decisions are the most important ones a political
community makes, so our system of government was designed to have them
made by the political branches—by those who answer to the voters, to the
people whose lives are at stake.  When the political branches abdicate this
first responsibility of government, sitting by as it is usurped by politically in-
sulated judges, they deny us the freedom to decide for ourselves what our se-
curity requires.  We are then the subjects of judges rather than masters of our
own destiny.406
That debate, however, is the province of an expert in a different area.
406. Conn Carrol, Founding Father Never Intended Courts to Make National Security
Decisions, THE FOUNDRY (March 26, 2010, 10:14 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/
2010/03/26/founding-fathers-never-intended-courts-to-make-national-security-de
cisions/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=micro-blog&utm_campaign=twitter.
